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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1. Regulatory background: How much is at stake?
The European Union and the United States are negotiating a proposed trade liberalization treaty, the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Supporters of the treaty suggest that it will 
bring big economic gains to both Europe and America; a widely cited study estimates annual gains for 
the EU of €68 – 119 billion1.  Reduction of tariffs, the traditional form of trade liberalization, plays only 
a small part in the plans for TTIP, since average tariffs on EU-US trade are already less than 3 percent. 
The projected benefits of TTIP are based almost entirely on removal of “non-tariff barriers to trade.” 
Bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles are said to limit trade at present; TTIP would remove these 
obstacles, by harmonizing standards in the EU and the US. In such a process, it will be hard to avoid 
downward harmonization, adopting the weaker of European or American standards.
If TTIP led to downward harmonization, what would be lost? Regulations are not arbitrary bureaucratic 
impediments to business. Rather, they are often designed to protect human health and well-being, 
sustainable communities, and the natural environment. The EU has adopted a precautionary approach 
to protection of health and environment, while the US, since the 1990s, has increasingly demanded that 
regulations be justified by cost-benefit calculations. The result is frequently that American standards 
are weaker, so that downward harmonization would mean adopting the US position.
Many of the benefits of European regulations, while of obvious importance, are difficult or impossible 
to express in monetary terms. This occurs in part because precautionary regulations are often designed 
to avoid rare but costly disasters. What is the monetary value of reducing the likelihood of outbreaks 
like mad cow disease, worst-case toxic chemical exposures such as PCBs or asbestos, or catastrophic 
climate risks? 
A number of studies have estimated the overall value of the benefits of European regulations, or health 
and environmental costs that could be addressed by future regulations, yielding estimates that are 
comparable to or larger than the estimated gains from TTIP.
 • A 2011 study estimated that the costs of not yet meeting EU standards for 2020 in six areas  
  of regulation – waste, biodiversity and nature, water quality, air quality, chemicals policy, and  
  noise – amounted to €200 – 300 billion per year. The costs of failure to meet standards   
  already in effect in 2011 was estimated at €50 billion per year. 
 • The burden of disease costs attributable to endocrine-disrupting chemicals in the EU has  
  been estimated at €157 billion per year.
 • The European Environment Agency values the health effects of industrial air pollution,   
  excluding climate impacts, at an annual average of €47 – 135 billion. Another analysis   
  concluded that the projected health impacts of air pollution in the EU in 2025 are worth €218  
  billion to €742 billion per year; about one-fourth of that amount could be avoided by   
  technically feasible reductions in emissions.
While agreeing that there are large benefits of health and environmental regulation, these studies differ 
widely in coverage and methodology. This report looks more specifically at regulations and regulatory 
benefits that might be at risk under TTIP. Just two categories, the benefits of REACH and of renewable 
1  All facts and references to research and publications in the Executive Summary also appear in the body of the report; see 
later sections for sources and citations.
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energy standards, are worth at least €46 – 110 billion per year, almost equal to the estimated 
benefits of TTIP. Since many other areas of regulation also have important benefits, the total value of 
European regulations is far greater than the estimated value of TTIP.
Many TTIP proposals have included an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) process, which could 
enforce downward harmonization and lead to widespread rollbacks of valuable regulations. ISDS 
mechanisms in existing treaties have allowed private investors to sue for damages attributed to other 
countries’ laws and regulations. Special-purpose tribunals, outside the legal systems of the participating 
countries, have final authority to assess penalties for policies that are barriers to trade. EU countries, 
particularly new member states, have been forced to pay substantial sums in ISDS judgments.
1.2. Chemicals policy
The contrast between EU and US regulations may be sharpest in the area of chemicals policy. REACH 
requires European chemical manufacturers and importers to submit a specified list of information 
on health and environmental effects of their chemicals; it creates procedures for restricting the use 
of substances that do not meet safety standards; and it encourages substitution of safer substitutes 
for harmful chemicals. The US equivalent, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), only requires 
companies to supply any information that already exists on their chemicals. TSCA places the burden 
of proof on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a government agency, to justify any new 
regulation of hazardous chemicals; the standards of proof are so demanding that EPA has almost never 
proposed rules limiting production of chemicals. 
The US chemical industry has tried for years to change or eliminate REACH. In 2013, the American and 
European chemical industries developed a joint proposal to use TTIP to weaken chemical regulation, 
allowing rollback of several aspects of REACH, and preventing the development of stronger regulations 
by EU member states or states within the US. Meanwhile, hazardous chemicals continue to be widely 
used in America, and in the world. 
Many studies of the benefits of REACH appeared in the debate leading to its adoption in 2007. One 
assumed that REACH might avoid the costs of cleaning up one major chemical hazard. Another looked 
at the reduction, due to REACH, in the costs of purifying drinking water and disposing of sediment and 
sewage sludge. At least three studies estimated the value of a range of health benefits resulting from 
REACH. The combined total is equivalent, at today’s prices, to an annual benefit of €11 – 47 billion.
1.3. Climate and energy regulations
The EU is a world leader in climate policy, with per capita carbon emissions around half as high as the 
US, although still far above a sustainable level. The Energy Roadmap 2050 calls for nearly complete 
elimination of greenhouse gases by midcentury, while near-term targets are expressed in a series of 
other policies and directives. The contrast with US policy is not as stark as in chemicals: American 
standards are stricter on (non-carbon) air pollution from power plants, and comparable to European 
standards on vehicle fuel efficiency; many climate and energy policies are set at the state level, with 
some states such as California approaching European standards, while some others do almost nothing. 
At the federal level, however, new American policies are constrained by partisan political stalemate.
There are two outstanding accomplishments of European climate and energy regulation: the successful 
promotion of renewable energy; and the legitimation of an ongoing process of planning and progress 
toward long-term goals such as climate protection. As of 2013, renewable energy accounted for 25 
percent of EU electricity generation; wind and solar energy alone represented 10 percent of electricity. 
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The comparable US figures were only 13 percent and 4.4 percent, despite the extraordinary wind and 
solar resources in large parts of the country. Moreover, EU targets for 2020, expressed in the Energy 
Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and other measures, will be followed by another 
set of targets for 2030, which are already under discussion. Progress has slowed since the economic 
crisis, but the process itself remains in place, creating an important framework for continuing advances.
In 2013, renewable energy in the EU avoided 388 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas 
emissions and 54.3 million tonnes of oil-equivalent of coal combustion, as well as creating 1.25 million 
jobs. These benefits have a combined annual value of €35 – 63 billion.
1.4. Food and agriculture
Food and agriculture are among the areas with the highest tariff and non-tariff barriers to US-EU trade, 
in both directions. Studies suggest that full liberalization would benefit the US, causing an increase in 
agricultural value added in America and a decrease in Europe. The EU has often (not always) taken a 
precautionary approach to threats to health and the environment, while the US has insisted on cost-
benefit analysis as a basis for any new regulations. In the case of pesticides that are known to be harmful 
to bees, interfering with natural pollination of many crops, the same scientific findings are sufficient to 
justify preliminary regulation in the EU but not the US.
There are many benefits from European regulation of food and agriculture, including reduced exposure 
to hazardous pesticides, protection of food safety, improvement of animal welfare, and promotion of 
goals such as clean water, biodiversity, and other environmental objectives. There are, however, few 
studies that place monetary values on these benefits. Much of the limited available research has taken 
place in the US rather than Europe.
Europe has stricter regulation of pesticides, banning at least 82 pesticides that are allowed in America; 
9 of these are known carcinogens and 6 others are classified as “extremely hazardous” by the World 
Health Organization. A study that appears to be the only comprehensive evaluation of pesticide 
damages estimated that US pesticide use in the early 2000’s imposed health and environmental costs 
of $9.6 billion annually. If the same cost per hectare of agricultural land applied to the EU today, it would 
imply annual damages of €4.3 billion. Some of that is already avoided by existing European regulations, 
and more could be avoided by future standards.
Food processing regulations are a cause of ongoing conflict between the EU and the US. On 
precautionary grounds, the EU bans the use of ractopamine in pork, chlorine chemical washes for 
poultry, and growth-promoting hormones in beef – all of which are permitted in the US. It is difficult 
to trace direct, quantitative links from such regulations to resulting health benefits, although the value 
of food safety rules becomes clear in the cases when they fail. Mad cow disease and other livestock 
disease outbreaks have imposed costs in the billions of euros, leading to hundreds of human deaths 
and the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of animals. The latest comprehensive estimate of the cost 
of foodborne illness in America found an annual cost of $77.7 billion, equivalent to €212 per capita at 
today’s prices. Comparably detailed figures are apparently not available for Europe.
European regulations have achieved important successes in animal welfare, including elimination of 
battery cages for hens, improved space and standards for pigs, a ban on animal testing for cosmetics, 
and continuous improvement in animal transport conditions. Many studies have estimated that most 
consumers are willing to pay premiums – for example, price increases of 14 to 34 percent – for meat and 
eggs from animals raised in humane conditions. An American cost-benefit analysis estimated the value 
to consumers of a national requirement for cage-free egg production (currently required in only two US 
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states). If Europeans experience the same average per capita benefits as Americans do from cage-free 
eggs, then the EU requirement of cage-free conditions for hens has an annual value of €3.7 billion.
1.5. Selected other regulations
Public procurement – spending by public authorities on works, goods and services – amounts to 18 
percent of Europe’s GDP. EU rules on procurement allow public contracts to reflect environmental, 
social, and product quality criteria along with price; to include life-cycle costing, incorporating the 
externalities associated with producing a final product; and to favor tenders that hire the long-term 
unemployed or other disadvantaged groups.
Procurement rules have been described as obstacles to EU-US trade, in both directions; US construction 
companies have identified public procurement standards as the most important non-tariff barrier to 
their expansion in Europe. The standards employed in many trade treaties could imply that procurement 
should be based on lowest cost alone, rejecting the broader purposes of EU procurement rules. 
Data services and privacy are another area in which Europe and America have adopted opposite 
approaches. The European Directive on Data Protection prevents dissemination of data on an individual 
unless the individual has given unambiguous, specific consent; it also prohibits manipulative, secret 
collection of personal data. A revision of the directive, currently under discussion, would establish the 
“right to be forgotten” (the right to delete obsolete and unwanted data), application of EU rules to all 
companies that sell products or collect data in Europe, and other measures. 
In the US, on-line merchants and other organizations can often make decisions about future use of 
personal data, which individuals are powerless to prevent. Under the Safe Harbor Framework, US 
businesses can certify their own compliance with standards equivalent to EU rules, in order to allow 
them to conduct on-line transactions in Europe. This framework has become controversial, and will need 
to be revised to correspond to the revised directive on data protection. The Snowden revelations have 
demonstrated that there are national security as well as commercial issues at stake in the protection of 
data services and on-line privacy.
Labor rights and social welfare also reveal deep differences between European and American 
regulations, in the areas of labor rights, the role of unions, social services, and public welfare.  For 
example, in the area of working time regulation, the EU limits all workers to an average of 48 hours 
per week, including any overtime, and requires a paid annual leave of at least 4 weeks. The US has no 
comparable standards; it requires that non-professional employees receive a 50 percent wage premium 
for work in excess of 40 hours per week, but sets no maximum hours of work or minimum paid annual 
leave. US regulations are closer to, though still weaker than, EU standards for parental leave for childbirth 
or adoption. 
Finally, in an area of detailed, specific regulation in both systems, the EU limits truck drivers to 9 hours of 
driving per day, 56 hours per week, and 90 hours per fortnight. The corresponding US limits are 11 hours 
of driving per day and 70 hours every 8 days. The government agency that developed the US standards 
wanted to propose less than 11 hours per day, but found that cost-benefit analysis did not support that 
proposal – even though crashes involving trucks kill nearly 4,000 people per year, and the annual cost 
of truck and bus crashes in America has been estimated at $99 billion. The US Congress is currently 
proposing to allow an even weaker standard, 82 hours of truck driving per week.
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1.6. The gains from TTIP: Positive or negative?
The many dimensions of regulatory benefits are invisible in most studies of the economic impacts of 
TTIP. Regulations are seen merely as non-tariff barriers to trade, which have to be rolled back to achieve 
the estimated income gains from liberalization. Such estimates, however, are based on global trade 
models, almost all of which rely on the assumption of permanent full employment: workers displaced 
from one sector by TTIP will always find work in another. This assumption renders the models unable to 
analyze job gains or losses. Full employment is an input to such models, not an output.
One major assessment of TTIP, by Jeronim Capaldo, uses a United Nations model, which allows future 
policies to result in changes in employment. He finds that TTIP would lead to a gain of 784,000 jobs in 
the US and a loss of 583,000 jobs in the EU. A critique of Capaldo’s work insists that he uses methods 
that virtually all economists would reject. Capaldo’s response is that policymakers have to decide 
whether it is more reasonable to assume permanent full employment, implying gains from TTIP, or to 
assume that employment can vary and the economy is driven by demand, implying losses from TTIP.
TTIP would put many of the benefits of European regulation at risk: protection of human health and 
the natural environment, maintenance of social and labor standards, creation of strong and sustainable 
communities, stabilization of the earth’s climate. Why risk losing these greater goods in the pursuit of 
small and uncertain income gains projected by some but not all economic models? 
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2. TRADE LIBERALIZATION TODAY 
The European Union and the United States are negotiating a proposed treaty to liberalize trade, the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Supporters of the treaty suggest that it will result 
in big economic gains on both sides of the Atlantic. According to a study of TTIP by the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 
Under a comprehensive agreement, GDP is estimated to increase by between 68.2 and 119.2 
billion euros for the EU and between 49.5 and 94.9 billion euros for the US.2
Another study, from CEPII, provides a similar estimate, projecting that TTIP will bring annual gains of $98 
billion to the EU and $64 billion to the US. CEPII’s projected benefit for the EU is equivalent to 84 billion 
euros per year at today’s prices.3
Viewed in isolation, these numbers might sound large. Yet they are actually small when seen in perspective, 
from at least two points of view.4 The projected gains from TTIP are smaller than the benefits of European 
regulations that might be at risk under the treaty, as this report will demonstrate. And the projected gains 
from TTIP are smaller than past estimates of the value of trade liberalization.
Projections of large benefits from trade liberalization have been heard for many years. But the remaining 
opportunities are growing smaller, because there is so little protectionism left in the world economy. In 
the 1990s and earlier, there were substantial tariffs and quotas that limited international trade. Since that 
time, negotiations have led to far-reaching reductions in tariffs and trade barriers, including important 
measures such as China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, and the end of textile quotas 
under the Multi Fibre Agreement, which expired in 2004. The expansion of the EU from 12 members in 
the early 1990s to 28 today has liberalized and expanded trade within Europe. Even by 2005, detailed 
estimates of the remaining global gains from trade liberalization were much smaller than in earlier years.5
Paul Krugman, who received a Nobel Prize in economics for his work on trade theory, recognizes past 
benefits from liberalization, but now says that “Trade restrictions just aren’t a major drag on the world 
economy these days, so the gains from liberalization must be small.”6  Cutting the tiny remaining barriers 
to trade, according to Krugman, “isn’t going to give you a boost that you’ll be able to tell from statistical 
noise.”7 
Average tariffs on EU-US trade are now less than 3 percent, too small to have much effect on either 
Europe or America.8  Projections of large economic benefits from TTIP are based almost entirely on a new 
category of policy changes: the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. According to CEPR, 
Reducing non-tariff barriers will be a key part of transatlantic liberalisation. As much as 80% 
of the total potential gains come from cutting costs imposed by bureaucracy and regulations, 
2  Centre for Economic Policy Research (2013), “Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic As-
sessment,” 2.
3  CEPII (2013), “Transatlantic Trade: Whither Partnership, Which Economic Consequences?” CEPII’s estimates are in 2007 
dollars, which were converted to 2014 dollars, then converted to euros at €1.00 = $1.33.
4  See also the critique of the CEPR study, from the similarly named but unrelated American organization, Center for Economic 
Policy Research, at http://www.cepr.net/documents/TTIP-brief-08-2015.pdf. 
5   Frank Ackerman and Kevin P. Gallagher (2008), “The Shrinking Gains from Global Trade Liberalization in Computable Gen-
eral Equilibrium Models: A Critical Assessment, International Journal of Political Economy, 50-77. 
6   Krugman (2015), “TPP at the NABE”, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/tpp-at-the-nabe/. 
7   Krugman (2015a), “Suspicious Nonsense on Trade Agreements”, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/suspi-
cious-nonsense-on-trade-agreements/.  
8   See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states/. 
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as well as from liberalising trade in services and public procurement.9 
TTIP, in other words, is viewed by its supporters primarily as a means to remove bureaucratic and regulatory 
barriers. This would harmonize standards in the US and EU, promoting efficiency and expanding mutual 
opportunities for trade.
Harmonization of standards could have several different meanings. It is possible to harmonize upward, 
adopting the stricter of US and EU standards – or downward, adopting the weaker of the two. The 
European Commission has repeatedly stated that it will not accept downward harmonization, but this 
may not be enough to eliminate the risk that TTIP will generally weaken standards. European negotiating 
positions have asserted the right of each side to regulate to the level it finds appropriate, but even if this 
principle is adopted, it could still give recognition to both sides’ regulations as equally legitimate. If the 
weaker side’s regulations appeared to lower costs or ease impacts on affected enterprises, these short-
run considerations could obscure the long-term benefits of regulation – leading to political demands for 
downward harmonization.  
An even vaguer formulation, “regulatory cooperation”, has been widely used in discussion of TTIP. This 
concept, which first appeared in the 1990s, means, in practice, that businesses from both sides should 
be given ample opportunities to intervene in, comment on and lobby about both sides’ regulations, from 
the initial drafting stages through evaluation and adoption.10  Early stages of regulatory cooperation 
have already muted European regulations on hazardous substances, among others; the US Chamber 
of Commerce has described regulatory cooperation as “a gift that keeps on giving”.11  EU proposals for 
TTIP would institutionalize a higher level of regulatory cooperation for the future, creating a mechanism 
to narrow the gap between European and American regulations. Again, downward harmonization is the 
most likely long-term outcome.
Moreover, many TTIP proposals have included a mechanism, the investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) process, which often enforces downward harmonization. ISDS clauses, included in many recent 
trade agreements, have allowed private investors to sue national governments in an attempt to change 
laws and regulations. Section 4 looks at the effects of ISDS on Europe under existing trade agreements, 
and at a variant on ISDS in recent EU proposals for TTIP.
If, through these or other mechanisms, TTIP led to downward harmonization of regulations, adopting 
the weaker of EU and US regulations in each area, what would be lost? Existing regulations are not, 
in general, arbitrary bureaucratic impediments to business; rather, they are designed to protect human 
health, sustainable communities, and the natural environment. The two sides of the Atlantic differ widely 
on chemicals policy, climate and energy policy, agriculture and food safety, public procurement, data 
protection and privacy, and labor and social rights. In each of these areas there are vital benefits of EU 
regulations and policies that could be at risk under TTIP, as this report demonstrates. 
9  CEPR (2013), vii.
10  Corporate Europe Observatory (2016), “Dangerous Regulatory Duet: How transatlantic regulatory cooperation under TTIP 
will allow bureaucrats and big business to attack the public interest”, http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attach-
ments/regulatoryduet_en021.pdf. 
11  Ibid., 7. 
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3. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS
3.1. The value of health and environmental protection
The multi-year process of US-EU negotiation, the extensive publicity and the passion (pro and con) 
surrounding TTIP all suggest that the stakes are high. There is no official blueprint for regulatory 
changes under TTIP, and US negotiating positions and proposals have not been made public. In multiple 
areas, however, European and American standards are widely different. In the words of a study for the 
European Parliament,12 
Overall, a pattern is apparent wherein the US have chosen to either not acknowledge risks 
to the environment and human health recognised by the EU, or to address such risks in 
ways which markedly differ from the approach chosen in Europe, for instance by merely 
promulgating voluntary guidelines rather than mandatory requirements.
At the dawn of the modern era of environmental protection, in the 1970s and early 1980s, America 
was ahead of Europe, and the world, in setting environmental standards. Yet as David Vogel has shown, 
Europe moved ahead and America fell behind in the 1990s, a pattern that continues today.13  Since 
the 1990s, EU standards often, though not always, have provided greater protection of human health, 
sustainable communities, and the natural environment. (Jonathan Wiener has offered a different view, 
suggesting that America and Europe are similarly precautionary.14  Much of the disagreement stems 
from different choices of case studies; for example, Wiener considers American initiatives in regulation 
of tobacco, nuclear power, and terrorism. 15 The areas of regulation examined in this report lend support 
to Vogel’s interpretation.)
Today, EU standards are formalized in the acquis – the body of laws and standards that EU member 
states agree to uphold. The environmental acquis, one of 35 chapters of the acquis, includes more than 
200 major legal acts. It 
…aims to promote sustainable development and protect the environment for present and 
future generations. It is based on preventive action, the polluter pays principle, fighting 
environmental damage at source, shared responsibility and the integration of environmental 
protection into other EU policies.16 
 A 2011 study for DG Environment assessed the costs of incomplete implementation of the environmental 
acquis.17  The study estimated that in six areas of regulation – waste, biodiversity and nature, water 
quality, air quality, chemicals policy, and noise – the costs of not yet meeting the standards for 2020 
amounted to €200 – 300 billion per year. The costs of failure to meet standards already in effect in 
2011 was estimated at €50 billion per year. These costs of incomplete implementation of standards – 
or equivalently, the benefits of future, higher levels of implementation – included the value of materials 
and energy that could have been recovered from landfilled waste, public willingness to pay for cleaner 
12   Christiane Gerstetter et al. (2013), “Legal implications of TTIP for the acquis communautaire in ENVI relevant sectors”, DG 
Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy; quote from p.21. 
13   Christiane Gerstetter et al. (2013), “Legal implications of TTIP for the acquis communautaire in ENVI relevant sectors”, DG 
Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy; quote from p.21. 
14   Jonathan B. Wiener, Michael D. Rogers, James K. Hamitt, and Peter H. Sand, eds. (2011), The Reality of Precaution: Com-
paring Risk Regulation in the United States and Europe. Washington DC: RFF Press/Earthscan. 
15   Wiener contrasts his work with Vogel’s in Jonathan B. Wiener (2013), “The politics of precaution, and the reality”, Regula-
tion and Governance 7: 258-265. 
16   http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm. 
17   COWI, Ecorys and Cambridge Econometrics (2011), “The costs of not implementing the environmental acquis.” 
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water, and the health benefits of reduced exposure to air pollution, toxic chemicals, and excessive 
noise.
Despite the progress that has been made in environmental protection, there is much more that remains 
to be done. A cost-benefit analysis of the Clean Air Policy Package concluded that under current 
legislation, the projected health impacts of air pollution in the EU in 2025 are worth €218 billion to 
€742 billion per year; about one-fourth of that amount could be avoided by a scenario of maximum 
technically feasible reduction in emissions.18 
Removal of non-tariff barriers to trade under TTIP could imply downward harmonization, reducing 
many European regulations to American levels. While proponents of TTIP project that it could be 
worth €68 - 119 billion per year to Europe, as seen in Section 2, the available studies of the benefits of 
regulation demonstrate that existing or potential future regulations could be worth even more. 
Are regulatory costs in general so high that there would be a great economic boost from reducing 
them? A recent report looks at six areas of European and international regulation, including REACH, the 
Montreal Protocol for protecting the ozone layer, and EU regulation of air pollution and of pesticides, 
concluding that claims of high and unwarranted costs consist of “crying wolf.”19  Research has also 
shown that the economic burdens of regulation are routinely exaggerated in American political debate.20 
An in-depth review of studies of the employment impacts of American regulations concluded that the 
net effects are close to zero: rigorous economic research does not support either fears of “job-killing 
regulations” or hopes for large numbers of “green jobs” resulting from environmental regulations.21 
18   EMRC (2014), “Cost-benefit analysis of final policy scenarios for the EU Clean Air Package.” Values are in 2005 euros. The 
range of values reflects differing hypotheses about valuation of mortality. 
19    Chemsec (2015), “Cry Wolf: Predicted costs by industry in the face of new environmental regulations.” 
20   Frank Ackerman (2006), “The Unbearable Lightness of Regulatory Costs,” Fordham Urban Law Journal, 1071-1096; Lisa 
Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman (2012), “The $1.75 Trillion Lie,” Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law, 
127-158; Lisa Heinzerling (1998), “Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,” Yale Law Journal, 1981-2070. 
21   Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel and Christopher Carrigan, editors (2014), Does Regulation Kill Jobs? (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press). 
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killing	regulations”	or	hopes	for	la ge	numbers	of	“green	jobs”	resulting	from	environmental	
regulations.21	
Box:	How	important	are	technical	standards?	
Defenders	of	TTIP	often	cite	cases	of	technical	differences	between	European	and	American	regulations,	
as	evidence	of	the	need	for	harmonization.	Some	obstacles	to	trade	have	been	caused	by	differences	in	
technical	specifications	for	the	same	product	or	process.	Some	standards	for	automobile	design	and	
testing,	for	electrical	wiring,	even	for	performing	the	same	food	safety	tests	are	needlessly	different	on	
the	two	sides	of	the	Atlantic,	adding	to	the	expense	of	trade	without	providing	any	real	benefit	to	either	
economy.		
On	a	grander	scale,	global	trade	would	be	simplified	and	manufacturing	could	be	more	completely	and	
efficiently	standardized	if	the	United	States	joined	the	world	in	adopting	the	metric	system.	This	goal	
seems	stubbornly	unattainable,	and	TTIP	is	not	expected	to	change	the	metric	status	quo.	(One	of	the	
least	prominent	candidates	for	the	American	presidency	in	2016,	Lincoln	Chafee,	advocated	conversion	
to	the	metric	system.)	
Could	mere	removal	of	technical	differences	in	standards	lead	to	the	large	projected	benefits	from	TTIP?	
And	is	a	major	treaty	needed	to	remove	these	barriers?	Aside	from	the	impossible	dream	of	a	metric	
America,	many	differences	in	technical	specifications	could	be	resolved	by	industry-level	negotiations,	
since	both	sides	would	benefit	from	standardization.		
3.2. Pricing	the	benefits	of	regulation	
What	are	European	regulations	worth	today?	If	a	new	trade	treaty	led	to	Europe	adopting	American	
standards,	what	would	be	lost?	The	answers	cannot	be	entirely	expressed	in	monetary	terms,	since	
some	ben fits	do	not	have	meaningful	prices.		
Any	accounting	of	the	benefits	of	regulation	must	include	the	value	of	protecting	human	health	and	our	
natural	surroundings.	This	is	not	a	new	idea:	for	nearly	a	century,	dating	back	to	the	work	of	Arthur	
Pigou22,	economic	theory	has	recognized	the	need	to	 rice	externalities	(the	unintended,	non-market	
impacts	of	economic	activ ty	on	third	parti s),	and	to	incorporate	externality	values	into	measures	of	
well-being.	Methods	of	valuation	are	discussed	in	many	standard	sources,	including	a	2013	study	for	the	
European	Commission,23	as	well	as	comparable	American	sources.	
																																								 																				
21
	Cary	Coglianese,	Adam	M.	Finkel	and	Christopher	Carrigan,	editors	(2014),	Does	Regulation	Kill	Jobs?	(Philadelphia:	
University	of	Pennsylvania	Press).		
22
	Arthur	Pigou	(1920),	The	Economics	of	Welfare	(London:	Macmillan	and	Co.).	
23
	European	Commission	(2013),	“Assessing	the	costs	and	benefits	of	regulation,”	http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/131210_cba_study_sg_final.pdf.		
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3.2. Pricing the benefits of regulation
What are European regulations worth today? If a new trade treaty led to Europe adopting American 
standards, what would be lost? The answers cannot be entirely expressed in monetary terms, since 
some benefits do not have meaningful prices. 
Any accounting of the benefits of regulation must include the value of protecting human health and 
our natural surroundings. This is not a new idea: for nearly a century, dating back to the work of Arthur 
Pigou22, economic theory has recognized the need to price externalities (the unintended, non-market 
impacts of economic activity on third parties), and to incorporate externality values into measures of 
well-being. Methods of valuation are discussed in many standard sources, including a 2013 study for 
the European Commission,23  as well as comparable American sources.
In practice, however, two problems limit the valuation of externalities, from opposite sides. On the 
one hand, the methods used to monetize health and nature may demean and diminish those values. 
Ethical issues are often involved, and the benefits of greatest importance are literally “priceless.”24  As 
Immanuel Kant observed long ago, some things have a price, while others have a dignity. 
On the other hand, the rise of anti-environmental politics in recent years, particularly in the United 
States,25  has challenged the valuation of many externalities, and has raised obstacles to the acceptance 
of new estimates of health and environmental costs. A handful of monetary values for major health 
and environmental impacts are generally accepted, frequently based on semi-standardized values for 
mortality and morbidity. Many other, less studied impacts, including many ecological impacts that 
do not directly affect human health, do not have established valuations, and are therefore ignored by 
default in cost-benefit calculations.
Even when there is agreement on the costs of health and environmental impacts, there are additional 
challenges to interpretation of these values. Cost-benefit analysis typically compares costs and benefits 
to society as a whole, even though the costs and benefits of the same policy are often experienced by 
different groups. Air pollution regulations may impose costs of emission control devices on factories 
and power plants, while improving the health of nearby communities. Conversely, easing the economic 
“burden” of such regulations, by weakening air pollution standards, may lower costs for factories and 
power plants, while harming the health of their neighbors. Some regulations are needed to achieve 
minimum acceptable standards of health for certain communities, even if costs are imposed on others.
Precautionary regulations are often designed to avoid or mitigate rare, catastrophic events. The value 
of regulation in this case depends on both the frequency and the magnitude of avoided or controlled 
catastrophes. One of the studies discussed in Section 5 found that if REACH avoids one major toxic 
chemical cleanup, the benefits of reduced cleanup costs will exceed the total costs of compliance with 
REACH.26  The value of climate policies, in Section 6, depends on the climate damages that might be 
avoided by reducing emissions. The worst climate damages often involve rare, extreme events, such 
as the disastrous heat waves of 2003 in Western Europe and 2010 in Russia and Eastern Europe. The 
22   Arthur Pigou (1920), The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan and Co.). 
23   European Commission (2013), “Assessing the costs and benefits of regulation,” http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/im-
pact/commission_guidelines/docs/131210_cba_study_sg_final.pdf. 
24   Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling (2004), Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing 
(New York: The New Press). 
25  Judith A. Layzer (2012), Open for Business: Conservatives’ Opposition to Environmental Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press). 
26  TemaNord (2004), ”Cost of Late Action – the Case of PCB,” Nordic Council of Ministers, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
environment/cost-of-late-action-the-case-of-pcb_tn2004-556. 
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value of food safety rules, a topic of Section 7, depends in part on how many tragic and costly outbreaks 
such as mad cow disease (BSE) will be avoided by regulations.
How many toxic chemical exposures, extreme weather events, and foodborne disease epidemics can 
be avoided or controlled by precautionary policies? How much should be done to address catastrophic 
risk? It would, in theory, be possible to spend too much on overly precautionary regulation. In practice, 
excessive precaution is rare but the opposite error is common: studies by the European Environment 
Agency (EEA) have shown that again and again, society has waited too long to take action on credible 
warnings of serious health and environmental risks, incurring much greater human, ecological, and 
economic costs as a result of delays.27  
Faced with these dilemmas, this report cites monetary valuations of benefits where possible, but also 
describes impacts of regulations in non-monetary terms such as lives saved, risks reduced, or diseases 
averted. The result is a multi-dimensional picture of the benefits of European regulations, only some of 
which can be expressed in terms of money.
3.3.  A partial accounting
Research on the value of regulations potentially at risk under TTIP, described in later sections of this 
report, finds two major areas where it is possible to estimate benefits in monetary terms: REACH, and 
renewable energy. As explained in Section 5, multiple studies have assigned monetary values to health 
and environmental aspects of the benefits of REACH. As explained in Section 6, there are climate, 
health, and employment benefits from the EU success in promotion of renewable energy. 
Table 3 1 shows that the annual benefits in these two areas alone are almost equal to the claimed 
annual benefits of TTIP. And there are many additional benefits of regulation, with annual values in the 
billions of euros. A US cost-benefit analysis of a ban on battery cages for chickens, described in Section 
7, would, if extrapolated to the EU, imply an annual benefit of almost €4 billion. As discussed in Section 
8, a loss of even one percent of the employment generated by public procurement could be worth €2-3 
billion per year. These and other benefits make it clear that the total value of EU regulations greatly 
exceeds the claimed benefits of TTIP. And as shown in Section 9, questions have been raised about the 
validity of the estimated gains from TTIP. 
27   See the two “late lessons” studies: EEA (2013), “Late lessons from early warnings: Science, precaution, innovation”; and 
EEA (2002), “Late lessons from early warnings: The precautionary principle 1896-2000”. There are almost no real cases of 
excessively precautionary regulation, as shown by Steffen Foss Hansen and Joel A. Tickner, “The precautionary principle and 
false alarms – lessons learned”, in EEA (2013). 
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Agency	(EEA)	have	shown	that	again	and	again,	society	has	waited	too	long	to	take	action	on	credible	
warnings	of	serious	health	and	environmental	risks,	incurring	much	greater	human,	ecological,	and	
economic	costs	as	a	r sult	of	delays.27		
Faced	with	these	dilemmas,	this	report	cites	monetary	valuations	of	benefits	where	possible,	but	also	
describes	impacts	of	regulations	in	non-monetary	terms	such	as	lives	saved,	risks	reduced,	or	diseases	
averted.	The	r sult	i 	a	multi-dimensional	picture	of	the	benefits	of	European	regulations,	only	some	of	
which	can	be	expressed	in	terms	of	money.	
3.3. A	partial	accounting	
Research	on	the	value	of	regulations	potentially	at	risk	under	TTIP,	described	in	later	sections	of	this	
report,	finds	two	major	areas	where	it	is	possible	to	estimate	benefits	in	monetary	terms:	REACH,	and	
renewable	energy.	As	explained	in	Section	5,	multiple	studies	have	assigned	monetary	values	to	health	
and	environ ental	aspects	of	the	benefits	of	REACH.	As	explained	in	Section	6,	there	are	climate,	health,	
and	employment	benefits	from	the	EU	success	in	promotion	of	renewable	ene gy.		
	
Table	3-1.	Annual	benefits	of	REACH	and	EU	renewable	energy	policies	
	
	
Table	3-1	shows	that	the	annual	benefits	in	these	two	areas	alone	are	almost	equal	to	the	claimed	
annual	benefits	of	TTIP.	And	there	are	many	additional	benefits	of	regulation,	with	annual	values	in	the	
billions	of	euros.	A	US	cost-benefit	analysis	of	a	ban	on	battery	cages	for	chickens,	described	in	Section	
7,	would,	if	extrapolated	to	the	EU,	imply	an	annual	benefit	of	almost	€4	billion.	As	discussed	in	Section	
8,	a	loss	of	even	one	percent	of	the	employment	generated	by	public	procurement	could	be	worth	€2-3	
billion	per	year.	These	and	other	benefits	make	it	clear	that	the	total	value	of	EU	regulations	greatly	
exceeds	the	clai ed	benefits	of	TTIP.	And	as	shown	in	Section	9,	questions	have	been	raised	about	the	
validity	of	t 	 ti ated	gains	from	TTIP.	 	
																																								 																				
27
	See	the	two	“late	lessons”	studies:	EEA	(2013),	“Late	lessons	from	early	warnings:	Science,	precaution,	innovation”;	and	EEA	
(2002),	“Late	lessons	from	early	warnings:	The	precautionary	principle	1896-2000”.	There	are	almost	no	real	cases	of	
excessively	precautionary	regulation,	as	shown	by	Steffen	Foss	Hansen	and	Joel	A.	Tickner,	“The	precautionary	principle	and	
false	alarms	–	lessons	learned”,	in	EEA	(2013).	
Category	 	 (billions	of	euros)	
Benefits	of	REACH	 (see	Table	5-1)	 10.8	–	47.0	
Benefits	of	renewable	energy	 (see	Table	6-2)	 35.5	–	62.8	
TOTAL	 	 46.3	–	109.8	
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4. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
4.1. ISDS in practice
Since tariffs are already very low, the TTIP discussion has focused on removing non-tariff barriers to 
trade. These “barriers” often consist of regulations that were designed to protect health and safety, the 
natural environment, and social and economic well-being. 
Most of the proposals for TTIP have included an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, 
similar to those in several recent trade agreements. The proposed Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement between the EU and Canada includes an ISDS process, as do many existing bilateral and 
regional trade agreements.  
Although the details differ among agreements, ISDS mechanisms allow private investors to sue for 
damages that they attribute to other countries’ laws, regulations and administrative decisions. A 
special-purpose tribunal, outside the legal and political systems of the participating countries, has final 
authority to assess monetary penalties based on national or subnational policies that are considered 
barriers to trade. Such penalties typically force governments to reverse the policies in question.
A total of 127 ISDS cases had been filed against EU countries through 2014, most of them against 
new member states in Eastern Europe.28 Most of the cases against EU countries have been brought by 
investors or firms based in other European countries.29 Of the 63 cases in which outcomes were known 
in 2014 (many were still unresolved), 28 resulted in judgments in favor of investors, or negotiated 
settlements. A judgment against Romania penalized the country for following EU laws, raising questions 
about ISDS and EU sovereignty. The case arose when Romania altered or withdrew investment 
incentives that had formerly been offered to a group of Swedish investors, in order to comply with legal 
requirements for accession to the EU. The European Commission intervened on behalf of Romania, but 
the ISDS tribunal still ordered Romania to pay the investors $250 million (€183 million).  
More than half of the ISDS cases filed against EU countries have involved environmental concerns. 
The Swedish power company Vattenfall has demanded compensation from Germany twice, for the 
regulation of a German coal plant, and for the decommissioning of two German nuclear power plants 
after Fukushima. The first case resulted in a negotiated weakening of water pollution standards for the 
coal plant; the second is still pending.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development puts the worldwide total of known ISDS 
cases through 2014 at 608, with a rising trend over time.30  Of the 356 cases that had concluded, 25 
percent awarded monetary compensation to the investor, and another 28 percent reached a negotiated 
settlement, often with confidential terms. Most of the investors who initiate ISDS cases are based in the 
United States, Canada, and Europe. The countries most often challenged in ISDS cases are Argentina, 
Venezuela, the Czech Republic, and Egypt, although 100 countries have faced at least one case.
Defenders of ISDS have argued that it is necessary in order to facilitate international trade and to 
attract foreign investment. But several countries have rejected ISDS without being excluded from trade 
and investment. South Africa and Indonesia have announced that they will not accept any new ISDS 
28   Friends of the Earth Europe (2014), “The hidden cost of EU trade deals: Investor-state dispute settlement cases taken 
against EU member states”. 
29   Cecilia Olivet (2013), “A test for European solidarity: The case of intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties”, Transnational 
Institute. 
30  UNCTAD (2015), “Recent Trends in IIAs [international investment agreements] and ISDS,” http://unctad.org/en/Publica-
tionsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf. 
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agreements. Brazil has never signed a treaty that includes ISDS provisions.31  These countries remain 
important trading partners for the US and Europe, and continue to receive foreign investment despite 
rejecting ISDS. If emerging economies such as South Africa, Indonesia and Brazil do not need ISDS to 
ensure access to international trade and investment, there is certainly no reason to think that Europe 
or the United States needs it.
4.2. The new EU proposal
Responding to widespread opposition to ISDS, the EU introduced a new proposal in 2015, replacing 
ISDS with a new Investment Court System (ICS). The ICS would establish permanent tribunals, 
rather than the ad hoc panels assembled for each case under many ISDS agreements; there would be 
improved transparency, a right of appeal to a new appeals court, and shorter timelines for decisions. 
Success of the ICS proposal, however, is far from guaranteed, as it has come under attack both for 
doing too much and too little. On the one hand, US negotiators and some business lobbies have been 
cool to the proposal, claiming that it tilts too far toward states and investors. As of early 2016, news 
reports suggested that the EU faces a “tough sell” on the ICS.32
On the other hand, NGOs opposed to ISDS have claimed that ICS is a mere rebranding; if ISDS has 
died, some have described ICS as a “zombie ISDS”.33  A detailed analysis of the ICS proposal by a legal 
scholar finds that it is still flawed, with language that enables the same kind of abuses seen under 
ISDS.34
31  The Economist (2014), “The arbitration game,” October 11. 
32  Hans von der Burchard (2016), “EU faces tough sell on TTIP compromise”, Politico, February 7, http://www.politico.eu/
article/eu-faces-tough-sell-on-ttip-compromise-malmstroem-froman/. 
33  Corporate Europe Observatory (2016), “The zombie ISDS: Rebranded as ICS, rights for corporations to sue states refuse to 
die”, http://corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2016/02/zombie-isds. 
34  Gus van Harten (2015), “Key flaws in the European Commission’s proposals for foreign investor protection in TTIP”, http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2692122. 
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5. CHEMICALS POLICY
5.1. Two styles of regulation
The contrast between EU and US approaches to regulation may be sharpest in the area of chemicals 
policy. REACH, adopted in 2007, requires manufacturers and importers of chemicals sold in Europe 
to submit information on selected effects of their chemicals on health and the environment to the 
European Chemicals Agency. If the required data are missing, the registrants have to perform the 
necessary tests. REACH also creates procedures for restricting the use of substances that do not meet 
specified safety standards, and encourages substitution of safer alternatives for harmful chemicals. 
The US equivalent is the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), adopted in 1976. Under TSCA, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for determining whether chemicals are 
hazardous. To take action against a hazardous chemical under TSCA, EPA must meet very demanding 
standards of proof – so demanding that the law has almost never been used. 
A comparison of REACH and TSCA prepared by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
identifies several major differences.35 
• REACH requires companies to provide information on all chemicals with European 
sales of at least one tonne per year, including a requirement to develop the information 
if data are missing. TSCA only requires companies that begin selling new chemicals 
in America to provide any information that already exists. New information does 
not have to be developed unless EPA formally adopts a rule governing a specific 
chemical. In practice, this is so difficult that EPA rarely adopts such rules; instead, 
EPA has voluntary programs to collect any information that companies are willing to 
provide.
• REACH provides a straightforward process for national and European agencies to 
identify substances of very high concern (for instance, carcinogens or toxic chemicals 
that accumulate in the environment). As of June 2015, this process had identified 31 
substances requiring authorization under REACH. Companies seeking authorization 
to use these substances have to demonstrate that the risks are adequately controlled 
or that socio-economic benefits outweigh the risks and no suitable alternative is 
available. TSCA, in contrast, places the burden of proof entirely on EPA to demonstrate 
that a chemical poses risks before it can be regulated. When proposing regulations, 
EPA must also demonstrate that it has chosen the least burdensome method of 
mitigating risk.
• Both REACH and TSCA allow companies to protect confidential business information, 
but REACH requires greater public disclosure; TSCA allows companies to make much 
broader claims of confidentiality.
As a result of the limits placed on government action by TSCA, EPA has developed rules limiting 
production of only five existing chemicals: polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), fully halogenated 
chlorofluoroalkanes, dioxin, asbestos, and hexavalent chromium. Although EPA spent 10 years 
developing its asbestos rule, US courts overturned the rule when it was challenged by industry, on the 
grounds that EPA had not presented enough evidence to justify a ban on this well-known, extremely 
toxic substance. EPA also requires companies to provide 90 days advance notice before beginning 
35  US Government Accountability Office (2007), “Chemical Regulation: Comparison of US and Recently Enacted European 
Union Approaches to Protect against the Risks of Toxic Chemicals,” GAO-07-825. 
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production or new uses of any of a list of 160 chemicals – but again, the burden of proof is on EPA to 
demonstrate that production or new uses of these chemicals would pose an unreasonable risk.
If the US chemical industry had only two choices, complying with REACH or losing access to European 
markets, the answer would be clear: loss of all US chemical exports to the EU would be roughly 1,000 
times more costly than the modest burdens imposed on US exporters by REACH.36 A third choice for 
the industry, however, is trying to weaken or eliminate REACH. The US Trade Representative’s annual 
report on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) always contains a litany of complaints about REACH. The 
latest version observes that “concerns regarding REACH have been raised at every WTO (World Trade 
Organization) TBT Committee meeting since 2003 by the United States and many other delegations...”37
In 2013, the American and European chemical industries developed a joint proposal to use TTIP to 
weaken chemical regulation, creating an industry-sponsored body to review regulations, along with new 
requirements for cost-benefit analyses, joint methods for risk assessment, evaluation and prioritization 
of hazards, and more. The proposal, leaked from the TTIP negotiations, provided the industry with 
several opportunities to roll back important aspects of REACH, and could prevent EU member states 
or states within the United States from developing their own, stronger regulations.38 
Meanwhile, hazardous chemicals remain a serious threat to health and environment. In the US, 81 
chemicals that are known to be hazardous are produced or imported annually in quantities of at 
least 454 tonnes (1 million pounds); 14 exceed 454,000 tonnes (1 billion pounds) per year, including 
formaldehyde and benzene, known to be carcinogens, and bisphenol A, an endocrine disruptor.39  
REACH provides a framework for addressing chemical hazards, but has not eliminated all such threats. 
An international team of prominent scientists has recently estimated the burden of disease costs 
attributable to endocrine-disrupting chemicals in the EU; their median estimate is €157 billion per year, 
more than one percent of EU gross domestic product.40  Another study found that roughly 65,000 
people in Europe die every year from the effects of carcinogens at work, more than twice the number of 
deaths from car accidents. Evidence from the UK suggests that almost all work-related cancer deaths 
are caused by just 10 chemicals, raising the possibility of a sharp reduction in occupational cancer 
deaths if a few deadly substances can be controlled.41  
The costs of toxic chemical exposure are of global importance, a dimension that should not be ignored 
by chemical-exporting regions such as the EU and the US. A United Nations study estimates that 
a selected list of toxic chemicals results in a worldwide total of almost one million deaths per year, 
comparable to malaria and equal to 1.6 percent of total deaths from all causes.42 
36  Frank Ackerman, Elizabeth A. Stanton and Rachel Massey (2007), “European Chemicals Policy and the United States: The 
Impacts of REACH,” Renewable Resource Journal, available at http://frankackerman.com/publications/costbenefit/European_
Chemical_Policy.pdf. 
37  US Trade Representative (2014), “2014 Report on Technical Barriers to Trade,” p.70, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/2014%20TBT%20Report.pdf. 
38  Center for International Environmental Law and ClientEarth (2014), “Toxic partnership: A critique of the ACC-CEFIC pro-
posal for trans-Atlantic cooperation on chemicals.” 
39  Environmental Defense Fund (2014), “Toxics Across America: Who Makes the Billions of Pounds of Toxic Chemicals Flow-
ing Through the US Economy Each Year.” 
40  Leonardo Trasande et al. (2015), “Estimating Burden and Disease Costs of Exposure to Endocrine-Disrupting Chemi-
cals in the European Union,” Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism 100, 1245-1255, http://press.endocrine.org/
doi/10.1210/jc.2014-4324. 
41  As described in Martin Myant and Ronan O’Brien (2015), “The TTIP’s Impact: Bringing in the Missing Issue,” European 
Trade Union Institute Working Paper 2015.01. 
42  United Nations Environment Programme (2013), “Costs of Inaction on the Sound Management of Chemicals,” http://www.
unep.org/chemicalsandwaste/Portals/9/Mainstreaming/CostOfInaction/Report_Cost_of_Inaction_Feb2013.pdf.  
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5.2. Costs of REACH
The debates leading up to the adoption of REACH in 2007 produced multiple analyses of the costs of 
REACH. The total costs to industry, primarily for testing and registration of chemicals, amounted to 
a few billion euros (estimates ranged from €2 billion to €7 billion, depending on a variety of technical 
assumptions). While this may look like a large expense on its own, it is a very small change in costs 
for a very large industry. REACH was always designed to take effect gradually, so the costs should be 
compared to the revenues of the European chemical industry over the phase-in period. One study, 
using a cost estimate of €3.5 billion, found that over an 11-year phase-in period the costs of REACH 
amounted to only 0.0006 (1/16 of one percent) of projected chemical industry revenues.43 
More recent discussion has focused on costs of REACH to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and 
impacts on innovation in the chemical industry. This has provided a more nuanced understanding of 
chemicals policy and led to minor revisions in regulations, but has not changed the underlying rationale 
or the projected accomplishments and benefits of REACH. 
Like any protective regulation, REACH inevitably poses larger proportional burdens on SMEs that use 
small volumes of multiple chemicals. One recent assessment estimated that the costs of compliance44 
with REACH for SMEs are twice as large as predicted in advance. It recommended a number of technical 
changes, both in SME business practices and in REACH implementation, to reduce the burdens of 
compliance.  An in-depth study of Dutch SMEs found that relatively few were affected by REACH, and 
recommended improvements in collection and dissemination of information, and in details of REACH 
implementation, to reduce burdens on the most affected SMEs.45  Responding to such concerns, the 
European Chemicals Agency has reduced the fees for REACH compliance for SMEs.46  
On the other hand, there are already signs that stringent regulation is having the intended effects. A 
study by the Center for International Environmental Law found that stronger laws have led to greater 
innovation in safer chemical alternatives: the adoption of REACH was followed by an upsurge in patents 
for safer alternatives to phthalates, a category of industrial chemicals that are endocrine disruptors.47 
5.3. Benefits of REACH
The benefits of REACH consist of preventing exposure to toxic chemicals, thereby avoiding health 
and environmental damages and reducing costs of sanitation and disposal. At least five studies have 
estimated the monetary value of some of the benefits of REACH. The results, expressed as annual 
benefits at current prices, are summarized in Table 5 1, below. 
One study estimated the cumulative costs of cleaning up one major chemical hazard, assuming that it 
will be half as expensive as the cleanup of PCBs, and will take 24 years. The result was a present value 
of €7 – 27 billion at 2003 prices.48  Converted to annual costs at current prices (see box, next page), 
43  Frank Ackerman and Rachel Massey (2004), “The True Costs of REACH,” Nordic Council of Ministers, http://frankacker-
man.com/publications/costbenefit/True_Costs_REACH.pdf. 
44  Ineke Gubbels, Jacques Pelkmans and Lorna Schrefler (2013), “REACH: A killer whale for SMEs?”, http://www.ceps.eu/
publications/reach-killer-whale-smes 
45  J.J. Boog, F.A. van Brokehuizen, H.B. Krop, and C. Veldhuis-Van Essen (2013), “Impact REACH op het MKB,”, http://www.
panteia.nl/Nieuwsoverzicht-IPM/~/media/7%20Panteia/Files/rapport-impact-reach-op-mkb.ashx 
46 http://echa.europa.eu/view-article/-/journal_content/title/verification-of-fee-reductions-echas-management-board-
adjusts-administrative-charge-levels 
47  Baskut Tuncak (2013), “Driving innovation: How stronger laws help bring safer chemicals to market,” Center for Interna-
tional Environmental Law. 
48  TemaNord (2004), ”Cost of Late Action – the Case of PCB,” Nordic Council of Ministers, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
environment/cost-of-late-action-the-case-of-pcb_tn2004-556. 
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the cost of cleaning up one major chemical hazard would be €0.5 – 1.7 billion per year.
A study commissioned by DG Environment offered several calculations of benefits of REACH.49  In 
the calculation the authors considered most robust, REACH was found to reduce the costs of drinking 
water purification and disposal of dredging sediment and sewage sludge by €2.8 – 9.0 billion per year, 
at 2005 prices. Converted to current prices, this is €3.4 – 10.9 billion per year. Other calculations in 
the report, estimating the public willingness to pay for clean drinking water or the avoidance of severe 
health impacts, yielded much larger estimates, in the tens of billions of euros.
Box: The annual value of cumulative benefits 
The estimated benefits of TTIP, as seen in Section 2, and other regulatory benefit estimates discussed 
in this report, are usually expressed in terms of annual amounts. However, four of the five studies 
included in Table 5 1 report the cumulative, multi-year present value of selected benefits of REACH, 
which are not directly comparable to annual benefits.
To convert cumulative present values into equivalent annual benefits, each study is assumed to have a 
constant level of real annual benefits over the time period of its analysis.50  The level of annual benefits 
is calculated to match the reported cumulative present value, at the study’s discount rate. 
Values expressed at earlier years’ prices have been updated to 2014 euros using the Harmonised Index 
of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the EU-28. Throughout this report, “current prices” refers to 2014 euros. 
Note that at current, near-zero levels of inflation, there is very little difference between data expressed 
in 2013, 2014, or 2015 euros.
Three studies examined aspects of the health impacts of REACH. Another study for DG Environment 
looked at the occupational health benefits of REACH, in practice focusing almost entirely on the 
reduction in occupational cancers.51  It estimated a cumulative 30-year present value of €17.6 – 54.4 
billion at 2000 prices, equivalent to annual benefits of €1.2 – 3.8 billion at current prices.
A separate study looked at the potential effects of REACH on three non-cancer occupational diseases 
caused by chemical exposure (dermatitis, asthma, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
COPD).52  It concluded that REACH would reduce costs of these diseases over the next 30 years by a 
present value of €21 – 161 billion at 2004 prices, equivalent to annual benefits of €1.4 – 10.8 billion at 
current prices.
Finally, a study by two economists analyzed the cumulative value of all the health benefits of REACH 
over a 15-year period.53  It estimated avoided medical expenditures at €4.8 – 20.1 billion at 2000 prices, 
49  DHI Water and Environment (2005), “The Impact of REACH on the Environment and Human Health,” DG Environment, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/pdf/background/impact_on_environment_report.pdf.   
50  In fact, the studies examine complex patterns of time-varying benefits. The simplifying assumption of constant annual 
benefits facilitates comparison among a wide range of studies. 
51  RPA (2003), “Assessment of the impact of the new chemicals policy on occupational health”, DG Environment, http://
ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/pdf/background/finrep_occ_health.pdf. More than 99 percent of the study’s 
estimated monetary benefit was due to reduction in occupational cancers. 
52  Simon Pickvance, Jon Karnon, Jean Peters and Karen El-Arifi (2005), “Further Assessment of the Impact of REACH on 
Occupational Health with a Focus on Skin and Respiratory Diseases,” European Trade Union Institute, http://www.etui.org/
Publications2/Reports/The-impact-of-REACH-on-occupational-health-with-a-focus-on-skin-and-respiratory-diseases. 
53  David Pearce and Phoebe Koundouri (2003), “The Social Cost of Chemicals: The Cost and Benefits of Future Chemicals 
Policy in the European Union,” World Wildlife Fund-UK, http://assets.panda.org/downloads/1654reachcbafindoc.pdf. 
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equivalent to €0.6 – 2.4 billion annually at current prices. It also estimated the total value to society of 
improved health outcomes due to REACH (which is much greater than avoided medical expenditures 
alone) of €56.7 – 283.5 billion, equivalent to annual benefits of €6.9 – 34.4 billion at current prices. 
These estimates of selected benefits of REACH are summarized in Table 5 1. The total shown in the 
table includes the two studies that are not based on health impacts, plus the estimate for the total social 
value of health outcomes; other health impact calculations are excluded to avoid double-counting.
None of these studies claims to present a complete estimate of all the impacts of REACH. Each 
analyzes only one portion of the expected benefits. Nonetheless, at the low end of the range of benefits 
estimated here, a single year’s benefits of about €11 billion exceed the total, cumulative costs of 
REACH. At the high end of this range, REACH alone provides annual benefits of €47 billion, equal to 
more than one-third of the high end of the claimed total benefits from TTIP (which were €119 billion, as 
noted in Section 2). The risks of downward harmonization, replacing REACH with something more like 
America’s TSCA, would include the loss of most or all of the benefits of REACH, with annual values, as 
shown in Table 5 1, in the tens of billions of euros. 
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DG	Environment	(2005)	 Reduced	costs	of	drinking	water	purification,	
sewage	sludge	and	dredging	disposal	
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6. CLIMATE AND ENERGY REGULATIONS
6.1. Models of regulation
The EU is a world leader in climate policy, already taking significant steps toward a sustainable, low-
carbon future. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as of 2012, were 7-13 tonnes of CO2-equivalent per 
capita54 in almost all of the EU – still far above a sustainable level, but distinctly lower than the US, at 
20 tonnes per capita.  To what extent does this difference reflect contrasting regulations and policies?
European and American regulations take very different approaches to the linked problems of climate 
change and energy policy. The differences are not as stark and simple as in the case of chemicals policy. 
But there is, nonetheless, a wide gap between the two systems; harmonization to American standards 
would lead to real losses for Europe. 
The European model
The EU has adopted an overall vision, the Energy Roadmap 2050, calling for nearly complete 
elimination (80 to 95 percent reduction) of greenhouse gases by midcentury. More specific near-term 
targets are expressed in a series of directives and policies, including the Renewable Energy Directive, 
the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Clean Air Policy Package, and others. Some initiatives have involved 
policies enacted at the level of the EU as a whole, such as the EU Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) for greenhouse gas emissions from regulated sectors. In many cases, however, EU decisions call 
for member states to meet individual targets and adopt national policies implementing the broader 
directives. For example, the Renewable Energy Directive, calling for 20 percent of total EU energy 
consumption to come from renewable sources by 2020, sets out national targets ranging from 10 
percent for Malta to 49 percent for Sweden, based on local conditions.
In comparison to the American system (described below), there are two outstanding accomplishments 
of European climate and energy regulation. One is the promotion of renewable energy, which is 
expanding rapidly. The second is the legitimation of an ongoing process of planning and progress 
toward long-term goals such as climate protection.
The EU appears to be on track to meet or exceed the 2020 renewables target, even though some 
member states may fail to reach their individual targets. Discussion is now underway about the targets 
for 2030 and beyond.55  As of 2013, renewable energy represented 25 percent of all EU electricity 
generation. Biomass, renewable waste, and hydropower are large parts of the renewable energy supply, 
but wind and solar power are expanding rapidly. The share of EU electricity coming from wind and 
solar power rose from 1.8 percent in 2004 to 10.2 percent in 2013.56  Much of the growth of renewable 
energy in the EU has come from feed-in tariffs or feed-in premiums for renewable electricity generation, 
guaranteeing fixed rates – above the market rate for electricity – for a specified number of years.
Beyond the specific results to date in areas such as renewable energy, the success of the European 
climate and energy policy system is the existence of the system itself. A broad vision, as expressed in 
the Energy Roadmap and other documents, provides the framework for near-term policies. Success in 
meeting one round of targets leads to discussion of targets for the next round. Even under the Energy 
54  From the EDGAR database, http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. The only EU countries with GHG emissions for 2012 above 
13 tonnes of CO2-equivalent per capita were Luxembourg (24.1), Estonia (18.0), Ireland (13.6), and the Czech Republic 
(13.04). 
55  European Commission (2014), “Impact Assessment: A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 
up to 2030”; see also European Commission (2011), “Energy Roadmap 2050”. 
56  Calculated from Eurostat data. 
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Efficiency Directive, where it will be harder to meet the 2020 target, an EU summit meeting has already 
agreed to a higher target for 2030.57  Progress has slowed due to the economic crisis and the budget 
constraints faced by many governments, with some prominent voices now calling for rolling back or 
limiting the scope of energy and climate regulation, but thus far the process itself remains in place. 
The legitimacy of long-run environmental goals and planning for future progress is a valuable 
accomplishment, independent of the specific measures involved. It is essential for climate policy, where 
decades of negotiation, planning and coordinated international action will be required for success. It is 
a sharp contrast to the American approach to the same questions.
The American model
The United States had an impressive start in energy and environmental regulation. The Clean Air Act, 
the Clean Water Act, and other path-breaking measures of the 1970s and early 1980s tackled the 
urgent problems of mid-twentieth century pollution. But as noted in Section 3, American progress 
stalled in the 1990s, while Europe moved ahead.
US policy remains strong in regulation of (non-carbon) air pollution, where American limits on common 
pollutants are generally stricter than European standards. These standards constrain power plant 
operation, forcing owners of coal plants to clean them up or shut them down. The recent American 
success in limiting greenhouse gas emissions, often attributed to natural gas displacing coal, is actually 
due to the combination of cheap gas, the expansion of renewable energy, and regulations that require 
costly pollution controls at coal plants.
In terms of energy efficiency, national policy in the US is largely confined to standards for vehicle fuel 
efficiency (either comparable to or slightly weaker than EU rules) and appliance efficiency. The other 
issues and standards addressed in the EU Energy Efficiency Directive, such as retrofitting buildings, 
or annual targets for end-use efficiency improvement, are left to the states within the US; some take 
varying levels of action, while others do nothing at all.
The US has adopted some national-level climate policies, such as the recently proposed Clean Power 
Plan – although that plan has relatively undemanding targets, relies on opaque, needlessly complex 
mechanisms (due to constraints imposed by partisan political conflict), and still faces additional 
judicial challenges before final acceptance. In climate policy, as in energy efficiency, however, most 
decisions are left to states. Even the Clean Power Plan leaves most choices about implementation up 
to the individual states.
A few US states match or exceed European standards. California’s climate and energy policies might not 
seem out of place in Europe, and the price of carbon allowances has recently been higher in California 
than in the EU ETS. A few states have feed-in tariffs for renewables, although often at low levels. But 
many states, including some with extraordinary wind and solar resources, have done little or nothing 
about renewables, energy efficiency or climate change. For the country as a whole, renewables are at 
most half as important as in Europe: all forms of renewable energy, including hydropower and biomass, 
represented just under 13 percent of US electricity generation in 2013; wind and solar power grew from 
0.4 percent of US electricity in 2004 to 4.4 percent in 2013.58
Moreover, the United States has no process leading to steady progress in implementing long-run climate 
and energy goals. Rather, an agency committed to cost-benefit analysis, the Office of Management 
57  The Energy Efficiency Directive calls for reducing final energy consumption in 2020 to 20 percent below a business-as-
usual baseline projection. An EU summit meeting in 2014 agreed to a 27 percent target for 2030.
58  Calculated from Energy Information Administration (EIA) data. 
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and Budget, has been established as the gatekeeper, requiring detailed economic justification for each 
proposed action. Continuity of policy and planning is not guaranteed; the modest federal subsidy for 
wind power has repeatedly been stopped by legislative conflict and then later restarted, disrupting 
long-term development of the industry. There is only the vaguest commitment to long-term reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions, and no political process that translates that commitment into an ongoing 
series of actions. 
6.2. Benefits of climate and energy policies
The benefits of EU climate and energy policies include reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, 
reductions in other air pollutants, and employment in renewable energy industries.
The goal of climate policy is to reduce the carbon emissions that contribute to climate change. 
Generation of electricity from renewable sources avoids the carbon emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion. The European Commission’s 2015 progress report on renewable energy, together with a 
related technical report from the European Environment Agency (EEA), document the results to date: 
for the EU as a whole in 2013, the increase in renewable energy since 2005 avoided the emission of 
388 million tonnes of CO2, and avoided the combustion of 54.3 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) 
of solid fossil fuels (hard coal, lignite, and peat; hereafter referred to simply as “coal”).59 The reduction 
in the cost of imported fuel resulting from the growth of renewable energy amounted to at least €30 
billion per year.
The social cost of carbon
Many attempts have been made to estimate the “social cost of carbon” (SCC), the monetary value of 
the damages caused by a tonne of CO2 emissions. Climate risks are increasingly serious but uncertain 
as to timing and exact magnitude, so estimates of the SCC have varied widely. Meanwhile, the price of 
carbon emissions on the EU ETS has been low in recent years, as a result of excessive past allocation 
of allowances and the continuing effects of the economic slump. For planning purposes the European 
Commission has assumed that in 2030, when the ETS is projected to reach 100 percent auctioning of 
allowances, the price of carbon emissions will be €35/t.60  The US government’s SCC estimate, used 
in cost-benefit analyses, is broadly similar: $40/t in 2015, rising to $56/t in 2030 and $77/t in 2050.61 
Research on the SCC has pointed out that US estimates are based on three economic models which 
minimize or overlook the risks of catastrophic, irreversible, or unexpectedly rapid climate change. 
Modifications of the same models to include such risks have repeatedly produced much higher values: 
$220/t in one study, and a broad range of uncertainty with worst-case values as high as $900/t in 
another.62  The Stern Review, the UK government report that transformed the economics of climate 
change in 2006, estimated an SCC of $85/t. More recently, adopting one of the models used in the US 
SCC calculation, Simon Dietz and Nicholas Stern have estimated that the SCC should be $32-103/t in 
2015, rising to $82-260/t within two decades.63  A literature review of SCC estimates concluded that 
59  European Commission (2015), “Renewable energy progress report”; European Environment Agency (2015), “Renewable 
energy in Europe – approximated recent growth and knock-on effects”. 
60  European Commission (2014), see note 51. This is the projected price in 2030 in the reference scenario, based on policies 
already adopted; other scenarios have carbon prices in 2030 ranging from €11/t to €53/t (see table, page 140). 
61  US EPA (2015), “The Social Cost of Carbon,” http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc.html. 
62  Frances C. Moore and Delavane B. Diaz (2015), “Temperature impacts on economic growth warrant stringent mitigation 
policy,” Nature Climate Change 5:127-131; Frank Ackerman and Elizabeth A. Stanton (2012), “Climate Risks and Carbon Prices: 
Revising the Social Cost of Carbon,” Economics E-journal 6. 
63  Simon Dietz and Nicholas Stern (2015), “Endogenous growth, convexity of damage and climate risk: How Nordhaus frame-
work supports deep cuts in carbon emissions,” Economic Journal 125, 574-620. 
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the SCC, adjusted for the known risks of climate change, should be at least $125/t.64  The European 
Commission has projected the SCC at €100/t in 2050, roughly in line with many of the higher, risk-
based values found in recent academic research.65 
Using the two European Commission values of €35/t and €100/t (which are roughly equivalent, 
respectively, to the current US government estimate, and the higher estimates emerging from recent 
research), the reduction of 388 million tonnes in CO2 emissions due to renewable energy in 2013 was 
worth either €13.6 billion or €38.8 billion. 
Health impacts of coal plants
The EEA has analyzed the costs of air pollution from European industrial facilities.66  From 2008 to 
2012, EEA estimates that the health effects of industrial air pollution, excluding climate impacts, had 
an average annual value of €47 – 135 billion. Two-thirds of the effects of industrial air pollution, in the 
EEA study, are attributable to the energy sector, primarily coal-burning power plants.
Using the same data sources as EEA, the Health and Environment Alliance (HEAL) has produced 
estimates specifically focused on coal plants.67  The health costs of electricity produced from coal, 
for the EU-27, are, on average, €0.0585 per kwh at today’s prices.68  Most of the damages represent 
premature deaths or serious illnesses such as chronic bronchitis caused by air pollution. Similar 
research has found somewhat lower but still significant values for the United States; the difference 
could be due to lower population density in areas near American coal plants, and/or stricter US air 
pollution controls that have reduced damages.69  
Since the growth of renewable energy avoided the combustion of 54.3 Mtoe of coal combustion in 
the EU in 2013, it also avoided €14.8 billion of health damages, according to the HEAL cost estimate.70 
Employment in renewable energy industries
The benefits of renewable energy also include its positive contribution to the European economy. It is 
an established industry, which now creates more than one million jobs. Table 6 1 presents estimates of 
jobs created in renewable energy (including manufacturing, installation, and operations) for the EU as 
a whole, and for the top two countries, Germany and Spain, in 2012-2013.71 
64  J.C.J.M. van den Bergh and W.J.W. Botzen (2014), “A lower bound to the social cost of CO2 emissions,” Nature Climate 
Change 4, 253-258. 
65  European Commission (2014), see note 51. This is the value for the reference scenario; other scenarios have generally 
higher SCC values in 2050. 
66  European Environment Agency (2014), “Costs of air pollution from European industrial facilities 2008 – 2012 – an updated 
assessment”. Values are in 2005 euros. The range of values reflects differing hypotheses about valuation of mortality. 
67  HEAL (2013), “The unpaid health bill: How coal power plants make us sick”. 
68  HEAL reported an EU-27 average of €0.053 per kwh, apparently in 2009 euros; it has been updated to 2014 prices. 
69  National Research Council (2010), Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced Consequences of Energy Production and Use (Wash-
ington DC: National Academies Press) estimates $0.0365/kwh average damages from coal plants in 2014 prices. Nicholas 
Z. Muller, Robert Mendelsohn, and William Nordhaus (2011), “Environmental accounting for pollution in the United States 
economy,” American Economic Review 101, 1649-1675, estimates $0.0385/kwh in 2014 prices. 
70  This assumes 40 percent energy efficiency in conversion of coal to electricity, which is the average of the four latest (2011) 
European values in Ecofys (2014), “International comparison of fossil power efficiency and CO2 intensity – update 2014.” It 
also assumes that all industrial uses of coal cause pollution at a rate equivalent to electricity generation. 
71  Calculated from International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), “Renewable Energy and Jobs: Annual Review 2014.” 
Job estimates are for 2013 in Germany and for 2012 in the rest of the EU. “Other” renewable jobs are in geothermal and small 
hydropower; large hydropower facilities are not included. 
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Cost-benefit analyses have often ignored changes in employment, perhaps based on economic 
theories that assume that full employment normally prevails. However, this assumption is difficult to 
sustain in a world of persistent high unemployment. Responding to this reality, US EPA has recently 
begun to consider the inclusion of employment effects of regulations in its cost-benefit calculations. 
A detailed study of the value of job loss, emerging from EPA’s discussions, concludes that the social 
value of a change in employment includes the change in earnings, the change in the value of non-
working time and the long-run effects of unemployment, and the change in tax revenues that are tied 
to employment.72  The study finds that the value of a job depends on the level of unemployment; at a 
10 percent unemployment rate, close to the current EU average, the estimated social value of a change 
in employment is 19.0 to 24.7 percent of the change in earnings.73 
These ratios can be applied to the jobs created by renewable energy in Europe. Assuming an average 
annual income of €30,000, the total payroll in jobs created by renewable energy is €37.4 billion.74  The 
social value of these jobs, at 19 to 24.7 percent of earnings, is €7.1 – 9.2 billion.
The value of the climate, health and employment benefits of renewable energy, summarized in Table 6 
2, is half of the total projected benefits of TTIP, as seen in Section 2.
72  Timothy J. Bartik (2015), “The social value of job loss and its effect on the costs of U.S. environmental regulation”, Review 
of Environmental Economics and Policy 9, 179-197.
73  Bartik (2015), Table 2, p.186. 
74 Eurostat reports an EU average hourly labor cost of €24.60 in 2014, of which 24.4 percent was non-wage costs paid by 
the employer; this implies an average hourly wage of €18.60 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
Wages_and_labour_costs). This is equivalent to €30,000 for a year of just over 1600 hours of work. 
     This may be a conservative estimate, since there is some evidence that wages are higher in renewable energy jobs than 
in other jobs in the same industries: Manfred Antoni, Markus Janser, and Florian Lehmer (2014), “The hidden winners of 
renewable energy promotion: Insights into sector-specific wage differentials”, IAB Discussion Paper, http://www.econstor.eu/
handle/10419/103059.  
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	 EU	Total	 Germany	 Spain	
	 (thousands	of	jobs)	
Biomass	 486	 127	 48	
Wind	 328	 138	 24	
Solar	 292	 68	 40	
Other	renewables	 141	 38	 3	
TOTAL	 1246	 371	 114	
Table	6-1.	Direct	and	indirect	jobs	in	renewable	energy,	2012-13.	
Source:	IRENA,	“Renewable	Energy	and	Jobs:	Annual	Review	2014”.	
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These	ratios	can	be	applied	to	the	jobs	created	by	renewable	energy	in	Europe.	Assuming	an	average	
annu l	incom 	of	€30 000,	the	total	payroll	in	jobs	created	by	renewable	energy	is	€37.4	billion.74	The	
social	value	of	these	jobs,	at	19	to	24.7	percent	of	earnings,	is	€7.1	–	9.2	billion.	
The	value	of	the	climate,	health	and	employment	benefits	of	renewable	energy,	summarized	in	Table	
6-2,	is	half	of	the	total	projected	benefits	of	TTIP,	as	seen	in	Section	2.	
																																								 																				
72
	Timothy	J.	Bartik	(2015),	“The	social	value	of	job	loss	and	its	effect	on	the	costs	of	U.S.	environmental	regulation”,	Review	of	
Environmental	Economics	and	Policy	9,	179-197.	
73
	Bartik	(2015),	Table	2,	p.186.	
74
	Eurostat	reports	an	EU	average	hourly	labor	cost	of	€24.60	in	2014,	of	which	24.4	percent	was	non-wage	costs	paid	by	the	
employer;	this	implies	an	average	hourly	wage	of	€18.60	(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Wages_and_lab ur_costs).	This	is	equivalent	t 	€30,000	for	a	year	of	just	over	1600	hours	of	work.		
					This	may	be	a	conservative	estimate,	since	there	is	some	evidence	that	wages	are	higher	in	renewable	energy	jobs	than	in	
other	jobs	in	the	same	industries:	Manfred	Antoni,	Markus	Janser,	and	Florian	Lehmer	(2014),	“The	hidden	winners	of	
renewable	energy	promotion:	Insights	into	sector-specific	wage	differentials”,	IAB	Discussion	Paper,	
http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/103059.		
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Category	 Avoided	impact		
or	benefit	
Unit	value	 Total	benefit	
(billions	of	2014	euros)	
Climate	benefits	 388	Mt	CO2	emissions	 €35	–	100/t	 13.6	–	38.8	
Health	benefits		 54.3	Mtoe	coal	combustion	 €0.0585/kwh	 14.8	
Employment benefits 1,246,000	jobs	 19.0	–	24.7%	of	wages	 7.1	–	9.2	
TOTAL	 	 	 35.5	–	62.8	
Table	6-2.	Annual	climate,	health	and	employment	benefits	of	EU	renewable	energy	
6.3. Risks	of	harmonization	
Harmonizatio of	US	and	EU	regulations	under	TTIP	could	put pressure	on	EU	climate	and	energy	
regulations.	The	United	States	does	not	have	Europe’s	br ad	commitments	to	climate	and	energy	policy.	
When	policies	create	differential	costs,	it	could	be	argued	that	they	are	barriers	to	trade.	The	existence	
of	the	EU	ETS,	EU	renewables	and	energy	efficiency	targets,	and	policies	such	as	feed-in	tariffs	that	
subsidize	renewables,	might	be	seen	by	some	investors	as	unfairly	penalizing	non-renewable	energy	
sources.	As	described	in	Section	4,	Vattenfall	has	already	sued	for	damages	from	Germany’s	regulation	
of	coal	plants	and	decision	to	phase	out	nuclear	power.	TTIP	might	allow	American	firms	to	do	the	same.	
If	TTIP	rewrites	or	overrules	climate	and	energy	regulations,	the	result	could	be	the	loss	of	some	or	all	of	
the	health	and	climate	benefits	from	renewables,	and	the	million-plus	jobs	in	the	industry.	More	
broadly,	it	could	mean	a	slowdown	or	reversal	in	Europe’s	progress	toward	a	cleaner,	sustainable,	low-
carbon	energy	system.	Harmonization	of	EU	standards	to	US	levels	would	harm	the	worldwide	efforts	to	
reduce	carbon	emissions	and	limit	the	damage	from	climate	change.	An	increased	reliance	on	coal	
would	also	mean	more	air	pollution,	a	step	backward	for	human	health	in	Europe.	 	
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6.3. Risks of harmonization
Harmonization of US and EU regulations under TTIP could put pressure on EU climate and energy 
regulations. The United States does not have Europe’s broad commitments to climate and energy policy. 
When policies create differential costs, it could be argued that they are barriers to trade. The existence 
of the EU ETS, EU renewables and energy efficiency targets, and policies such as feed-in tariffs that 
subsidize renewables, might be seen by some investors as unfairly penalizing non-renewable energy 
sources. As described in Section 4, Vattenfall has already sued for damages from Germany’s regulation 
of coal plants and decision to phase out nuclear power. TTIP might allow American firms to do the 
same.
If TTIP rewrites or overrules climate and energy regulations, the result could be the loss of some or 
all of the health and climate benefits from renewables, and the million-plus jobs in the industry. More 
broadly, it could mean a slowdown or reversal in Europe’s progress toward a cleaner, sustainable, low-
carbon energy system. Harmonization of EU standards to US levels would harm the worldwide efforts 
to reduce carbon emissions and limit the damage from climate change. An increased reliance on coal 
would also mean more air pollution, a step backward for human health in Europe. 
EUROPE’S REGULATIONS AT RISK                    |         bu.edu/gegi         |         04/2016 28
7. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
7.1. Trade and regulatory background
Both Europe and America have numerous, detailed regulations affecting food and agriculture. In both 
the US and the EU, tariffs are higher and non-tariff measures affecting trade are more important in 
agriculture than in industry.75  Feelings run high in this area; as of early 2016, it was one of the remaining 
areas of unresolved differences between the two sides, along with the ISDS issue discussed earlier.
The EU currently has a trade surplus with the US in the combined areas of agriculture, food and 
beverages, thanks in no small part to the American appetite for European wine. That surplus could 
quickly turn into a European deficit in food and agriculture if trade were fully liberalized.
Liberalization of trade in food and agriculture would lead to an increase in trade in both directions – 
but US exports would expand by more, leading to a net gain for the US and a net loss for the EU in 
agriculture. A study for the European Parliament finds that, under its principal scenario for liberalization, 
EU food and agriculture exports to the US would increase by about 60 percent, while imports from the 
US would increase by about 120 percent. Agricultural value added would fall by 0.5 percent in the EU 
and rise by 0.4 percent in the US. The study concludes, in part: 
• … Compared to their US counterparts, EU producers may be disadvantaged by the extra 
costs involved in complying with EU regulations. This is most relevant regarding EU 
constraints on the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), on pesticide use, and on 
food safety measures in the meat sector.
• If regulatory convergence were to level the playing field, there would be a risk of downward 
harmonisation… this could lead to major changes in EU legislation, which may undermine 
the traditional EU precaution and risk management policy on which the current regulatory 
framework is based.76   
The United States has a large, low-cost agricultural sector, both because of its natural resources and 
because it has generally weaker, less protective regulations governing health, safety and environmental 
impacts in agriculture and food production. As in the case of chemicals policy, European food and 
agriculture policies are based on a precautionary approach to health and environmental risks while 
American policies are based on calculations of expected risk, cost-benefit analysis, and least-cost risk 
management options. 
A comparison of the two approaches appears on the US EPA website, in a discussion of European 
policy toward pesticides that are harmful to bees, and are a potential cause of bee colony collapse 
disorder.77  In 2013 the European Commission, responding to a scientific report from the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA), restricted the use of three neonicotinoid pesticides (clothianidin, imidacloprid 
and thiametoxam) because they posed “high acute risks” to bees. 
There is no transatlantic dispute about the science: According to US EPA, “Based on currently available 
data, the EPA’s scientific conclusions are similar to those expressed in the EFSA report …” However, EPA 
explained that this was not sufficient for regulation in the United States, because the EFSA report did 
75  Jean-Cristophe Bureau et al. (2014), “Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade 
Agreement,” DG Internal Policies, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies.
76  Bureau et al. (2014), p. 12. 
77  US EPA (2013), “Colony collapse disorder: European bans on neonicotinoid pesticides”, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/
about/intheworks/ccd-european-ban.html. 
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not address options for risk management. EPA could only say that the three pesticides are not being 
banned or severely restricted in the US, but “are currently being re-evaluated …”
Trade liberalization could lead to expanded US food exports, with serious adverse consequences for EU 
production of beef, poultry, corn and wheat, as well as several other sectors.  Moreover, the entire fabric 
of precautionary regulation of health and environmental risks could be endangered, depending on the 
approach taken to harmonization in a liberalized trading environment. Among many other differences 
with EU standards, US regulations accept more pesticides, more genetically modified crops, and more 
potentially hazardous practices in meat production and preparation, while doing less to protect animal 
welfare.
7.2. Benefits of regulation
 A study of farmers’ cost of compliance with EU legislation, commissioned by the European Commission, 
describes multiple categories of benefits of agricultural regulation.78  There are economic and cultural 
benefits – for example, farmers may receive economic benefits from agricultural regulation and 
policies, including subsidies, reduced transaction costs (such as better information), and additional 
revenues from selling higher-quality products that are more in demand. Other citizens may value the 
role of farmers in preserving a culturally preferred, heterogeneous landscape with small producers and 
traditional settlements. 
There are also multiple health and environmental benefits from food and agricultural regulation. Reduced 
use of hazardous pesticides protects the health of farmers, farm workers and rural communities, the 
safety of food, and the biodiversity of the natural environment. Food safety standards protect the 
health of consumers and reduce foodborne illnesses. Animal welfare standards protect an increasingly 
important social value. Environmental standards for farming promote goals such as clean water, 
biodiversity, and greenhouse gas reduction.
It is difficult to calculate precise values for individual benefits of food and agricultural regulation, 
for several reasons. Farmers and farm workers are typically exposed to multiple pesticides, making 
it hard to determine which chemicals are causing adverse effects. Many regulations, such as food 
safety standards and procedures that have slowed the adoption of genetically modified organisms, are 
intended to prevent worst-case outcomes; in these cases the evaluation of benefits depends on the 
unknown magnitude of the occasional, extreme losses that have been prevented. 
There appear to be more American than European studies of food and agricultural impacts, and there 
are few, from any location, that lead to precise numerical estimates of the monetary value of regulatory 
benefits. Nonetheless, the available evidence, described below, makes it clear that the health and 
environmental benefits of European food and agricultural regulations are worth billions of euros per 
year.
7.3. Reduced pesticide use
The European Union regulates pesticides more strictly than the United States does, as shown by 
the story of neonicotinoid pesticides and the harm to bee colonies. A survey of pesticide regulations 
found that there are at least 82 pesticides banned in the EU but allowed in the US, including 9 known 
carcinogens and 6 others classified as “extremely hazardous” by the World Health Organization.79  The 
78  Centro Richerche Produzioni Animali (CRPA, 2014), “Assessing farmers’ cost of compliance with EU legislation in the fields 
of environment, animal welfare and food safety”, DG-Agriculture and Rural Development 
79  Center for International Environmental Law (2015), “Lowest Common Denominator: How the proposed EU-US trade deal 
threatens to lower standards of protection from toxic pesticides,” http://ciel.org/Publications/LCD_TTIP_Jan2015.pdf 
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same report compared 36 standards for allowable maximum pesticide residue levels in food, finding 
that EU standards were stricter in 33 cases. In 8 of the 36 comparisons, allowable concentrations of 
pesticide residues in food were 100 or more times as great in the US as in the EU. 80
There are few studies of the overall impacts of pesticides. One study examined known health effects 
of the top pesticides used in eight crop categories in each country of the EU-24 in 2003.81  These 
pesticides, which accounted for about half of the total mass of pesticides applied in Europe that year, 
caused annual health impacts equal to the loss of about 2000 disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). 
Using conventional values for DALYs, this amounted to annual damage costs of €78 million. One-fifth 
of that damage came from substances that are now banned from the European market. Although there 
were 133 pesticides included in the study, 90 percent of the damage was due to just 13 of them – raising 
the possibility that safer substitutes for a handful of pesticides could lead to substantial improvement.
According to a review of research on the subject, most studies find evidence that pesticides increase 
risks of major health damages.82  For example, 31 out of 43 studies find that for those directly exposed 
to pesticides (such as farmers and farm workers), exposure to some pesticides significantly increases 
the risk of cancer. Similarly, 11 out of 13 studies find that direct exposure to pesticides increases the risk 
of respiratory disease. For those with indirect exposure to pesticides (such as farmers’ family members 
or other residents of farming areas), 13 out of 16 studies find a significant link to increased risk of 
cancer. In contrast, there were fewer studies of health risks to consumers from pesticide residues in 
food, some finding cancer risks from specific residues such as DDT.
Apparently the only comprehensive valuation of the effects of pesticides as a whole is the work of 
David Pimentel. He estimates that US pesticide use totals 500 million kg per year, including more than 
600 different substances.83  According to Pimentel’s 2005 study, health and environmental damages 
from US pesticide use amount to $9.6 billion per year, including $1.2 billion in public health impacts; 
$1.5 billion costs of increased pesticide resistance; $1.4 billion in crop losses due to pesticide misuse, 
overuse, or drift; $2.2 billion in bird losses due to pesticides; $2.0 billion in the costs of monitoring 
and cleaning groundwater; and several smaller categories. The public health impacts are based on 
estimates of 35,000 poisonings (5,000 serious enough to require hospitalization), 10,000 new cases 
of cancer, and 45 accidental fatalities caused by pesticide use each year.  
Pimentel’s calculation of damages from US pesticide use is equivalent to €25 per hectare of agricultural 
land today, or €4.3 billion if applied to the EU as a whole.84  In other words, if the EU had the same 
intensity of pesticide hazards per farm hectare as the US, it would, according to Pimentel’s estimate, 
suffer €4.3 billion of annual health and environmental damages from pesticides. Some of that amount 
is already avoided by EU standards for pesticide use, and more could be avoided by stricter regulation.
The harm caused to bees by pesticides, and the consequent risk of losing the valuable pollination 
services provided by bees, has been a focus of recent research. A literature review identified 27 studies 
80  Calculated from Table 2 in Center for International Environmental Law (2015). 
81  Peter Fantke, Rainer Friedrich and Olivier Jolliet (2012), “Health impact and damage cost assessment of pesticides in Eu-
rope”, Environment International 49, 9-17. 
82  Henrik Andersson, Damian Tago and Nicolas Treich (2014), “Pesticides and health: A review of evidence on health effects, 
valuation of risks, and benefit-cost analysis”, Working Paper IDEI-825, Toulouse School of Economics. 
83  David Pimentel (2005), “Environmental and economic costs of the application of pesticides primarily in the United States”, 
Environment, Development and Sustainability 7, 229-252. Andersson et al. (2014) confirm that Pimentel’s work is the only 
comprehensive analysis of overall pesticide impacts. 
84  This calculation is based on agricultural areas of 372 million hectares in the US and 174 million hectares in the EU. It 
assumes Pimentel’s estimates are in 2003 dollars, converted to 2014 dollars using the US consumer price index and then 
converted to 2014 euros at €1.00 = $1.33. 
EUROPE’S REGULATIONS AT RISK                  |         bu.edu/gegi         |         04/2016 31
worldwide on the economic value of pollination.85  Seven of the studies evaluated pollination services 
in Europe, as shown in Table 7 1 (next page). Although no systematic totals are available, these studies 
suggest that the pollination services provided by bees have a value to European agriculture of billions 
of euros per year – a value that could be at risk if pesticides were to cause loss of bee populations.
Box: Who benefits from atrazine?
The economic benefits of chemical-intensive agriculture have often been exaggerated in American 
debate. Atrazine, a potent herbicide, is sprayed on most of the tens of millions of hectares of maize 
grown in the United States, making it the world’s second most widely used pesticide, after glyphosate. 
Although banned in Europe, atrazine is produced by a Swiss company, Syngenta. It is known to cause 
endocrine disruption in amphibians and other species, even at concentrations of 1 part per billion or less 
in surface water. Defenders of atrazine claim that it is economically essential to American agriculture, 
yet their own studies project that it increases maize yields by only 4 to 6 percent; independent studies 
have sometimes found yield gains of only 1 to 3 percent.86  
The latest Syngenta-sponsored studies of the benefits of atrazine find that it causes a 4.4 percent 
increase in maize yields – and an 8.0 percent drop in maize prices. As a result, farmers as a group 
receive lower total revenues for their crop when they all use atrazine. The claimed net social benefits 
of atrazine consist solely of the indirect benefits to consumers from lower maize prices, such as slightly 
cheaper beef and biofuels; the estimated gains to consumers are larger than the losses to farmers.87
7.4. Food safety and foodborne illnesses
A number of chemicals used in raising livestock and preparing meat have become the subject of 
international disputes, with sufficient evidence of harm to trigger precautionary policies in Europe, but 
not enough for proof of the need for action by American standards. Those disputes could arise again 
under TTIP. 
Ractopamine, used to promote rapid, lean growth of pigs in the United States, is known to cause 
elevated heart rates and other stress-related symptoms. A study of the effects of ractopamine in 
85  Nick Hanley, Tom D. Breeze, Ciaran Ellis and David Goulson (2015), “Measuring the economic value of pollination services: 
Principles, evidence and knowledge gaps”, Ecosystem Services 14, 124-132. 
86  Frank Ackerman (2007), “The economics of atrazine,” International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 13, 
441-449; Frank Ackerman, Melissa Whited and Patrick Knight (2014), “Would banning atrazine benefit farmers?”, Interna-
tional Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 20, 61-70. 
87  Maize is not the only input in the production of either beef or biofuels, so the resulting price decreases to final consumers 
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Date	of	study	 Country	(crop)	 Value	of	pollination	services	
(millions	of	2014	euros,	except	as	noted)	
2006	 Poland	 739	
1998	 UK	 458	
2008	 Spain	(glasshouse)	 668	
2014	 UK	(apples)	 52	
2014	 EU	(strawberries)	 1067	
2013	 Ireland	(oilseed	rape)	 5	
1998	 Italy	(plums)	 €389	/	hectare	
Table	7-1.	Estimates	of	the	value	of	pollination	services	in	Europe	
Source:	Hanley	et	al.	(2015),	Table	1.	Values	reported	in	2010	pounds	were	converted	to	2014	pounds	and	then	converted	to	
2014	euros	at	€1.00	=	£0.806.	See	Hanley	et	al.	(2015)	for	citations	to	original	studies.	
Box:	Who	benefits	from	atrazine?	
The	economic	benefits	of	chemical-intensive	agriculture	have	often	been	exaggerated	in	American	
debate.	Atrazine,	a	potent	herbicide,	is	sprayed	on	most	of	the	tens	of	millions	of	hectares	of	maize	
grown	in	the	United	States,	making	it	the	world’s	second	most	widely	used	pesticide,	after	glyphosate.	
Although	banned	in	Europe,	atrazine	is	produced	by	a	Swiss	company,	Syngenta.	It	is	known	to	cause	
endocrine	disruption	in	amphibians	and	other	species,	even	at	concentrations	of	1	part	per	billion	or	less	
in	surface	water.	Defenders	of	atrazine	clai 	that	it	is	 c 	 ti l	t 	 merican	agriculture,	
yet	their	own	studies	project	that	it	increases	maize	yields	by	 ly	 	t 	 	 erce t;	i e e e t	st ies	
have	sometimes	found	yield	gains	of	only	1	to	3	percent.86		
The	latest	Syngenta-sponsored	studies	of	the	benefits	of	atrazine	find	that	it	causes	a	4.4	percent	
increase	in	maize	yields	–	and	an	8.0	percent	drop	in	maize	prices.	As	a	result,	farmers	as	a	group	receive	
lower	total	revenues	for	their	crop	when	they	all	use	atrazine.	The	claimed	net	social	benefits	of	atrazine	
consist	sol ly	of	the	indirect	b nefits	 o	consumers	from	lower	maize	prices,	such	a 	slightly	cheaper	
beef	and	biofuels;	the	estimated	gains	to	consumers	are	larger	than	the	losses	to	farmers.87	
	
7.4. Food	safety	and	foodborne	illnesses	
A	number	of	chemicals	used	in	raising	livestock	and	preparing	meat	have	become	the	subject	of	
international	disputes,	with	sufficient	evidence	of	harm	to	trigger	precautionary	policies	in	Europe,	but	
																																								 																				
86
	Frank	Ackerman	(2007),	“The	economics	of	atrazine,”	International	Journal	of	Occupational	and	Environmental	Health	13,	
441-449;	Frank	Ackerman,	Melissa	Whited	and	Patrick	Knight	(2014),	“Would	banning	atrazine	benefit	farmers?”,	
International	Journal	of	Occupational	and	Environmental	Health	20,	61-70.		
87
	Maize	is	not	the	only	input	in	the	production	of	either	beef	or	biofuels,	so	the	resulting	price	decreases	to	final	consumers	
are	much	less	than	8	percent.	See	Ackerman,	Whited	and	Knight	(2014).	
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humans used six healthy, young adult volunteers; one of the six had to drop out of the study because 
of adverse health effects. The Sichuan Pork Trade Chamber of Commerce reports that 1,700 people in 
China were poisoned by eating pork containing ractopamine between 1998 and 2010.88  Ractopamine 
is now banned in China, Russia, the EU and many other countries, but not in the United States.
Poultry produced in the US is usually treated with antimicrobial chemical rinses, including chlorine 
dioxide, a toxic chemical. The EU has banned chemically rinsed poultry since 1997, calling instead 
for strict sanitary standards in poultry production and processing. The US has been challenging 
this EU policy since 2002, because it excludes most American poultry production from the EU 
market.89  There is debate about the level of risk posed by US chemical rinses. The European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) has found no major safety concerns with the use of some chemical rinses 
for poultry, nor has the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex). Scientific committees under the 
auspices of the European Commission, however, have concluded that there is not enough data to make 
a comprehensive assessment of the full range of risks involved in chemical rinses.90  
US positions may be particularly intransigent on this issue; a US government report on the subject 
says, “The U.S. poultry industry has indicated that it is unlikely to support a TTIP agreement that does 
not provide for better access to the EU of U.S. poultry products.”91  On the other hand, a description 
of US poultry inspection practices makes clear that the system relies primarily on self-inspection by 
producers, combined with computer modeling of pathogen detection data – and that high levels of 
pathogens have been detected on random samples of chemically rinsed, commercially distributed US 
poultry. 92
An even longer-standing dispute concerns the use of growth-promoting hormones in beef. Most US 
beef production uses hormones, while the EU bans hormone-raised beef. As a result, only a small 
quantity of US beef, certified to have been raised without hormones, can be sold in Europe.93  Both 
the EU ban on hormone-treated meat and US challenges to the ban date back to the 1980s. World 
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement processes have repeatedly been used in an attempt 
to resolve the conflict; the latest WTO ruling, in 2008, is mixed, allowing the continuation of both 
the EU ban on hormone-treated beef, and US and Canadian trade sanctions in retaliation against the 
ban. At least four EU scientific reviews of the issue have concluded that there is not enough data for a 
quantitative assessment that could demonstrate the absence of risk. As an EFSA panel concluded in 
the latest official European review of the issue, in 2007,
… epidemiological data provide convincing evidence for an association between the amount 
of red meat consumed and certain forms of hormone-dependent cancers. Whether 
hormone residues in meat contribute to this risk is currently unknown.94 
88  Center for Food Safety (2013), “Ractopamine Factsheet,” http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/ractopamine_fact-
sheet_02211.pdf. 
89  Renée Johnson (2015), “US-EU Poultry Dispute on the Use of Pathogen Reduction Treatments (PRTs),” Congressional 
Research Service, Washington DC. 
90  Johnson (2015), 3. 
91  Johnson (2015), 6. 
92  Steve Suppan (2015), “Food Import Re-Inspection and the ‘High Standards” of 21st Century Trade Agreements”, http://
www.iatp.org/files/2015_10_06_GFSM_SS.pdf. 
93  Renée Johnson (2015a), “The US-EU Beef Hormone Dispute,” Congressional Research Service, Washington DC. 
94  As quoted in Johnson (2015a), 8. 
EUROPE’S REGULATIONS AT RISK                  |         bu.edu/gegi         |         04/2016 33
 
Box: Foodborne illness in America
Do transatlantic differences in food safety regulations lead to different rates of foodborne illnesses? 
Most observers have concluded that it is impossible to make a meaningful comparison of American 
and European rates of foodborne illness, due to differences in diet, disease patterns, data sources, and 
medical standards. One widely publicized commentary recently concluded that rates of foodborne 
illness are higher in Europe than in America.95  That comment, from a consulting firm that frequently 
works for the American agribusiness industry, based its US illness data on the Foodnet survey, which 
counts the confirmed cases of ten leading pathogens in a fraction (15 percent) of the US population. 
Researchers at the US government’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) periodically 
produce more complete estimates of foodborne illness, based on Foodnet and many other data sources. 
The latest CDC estimate, using data for 2000-2008, finds an annual total of roughly 48 million new 
cases of disease, 128,000 hospitalizations, and 3,000 deaths. Using conventional American cost-
benefit valuations, the annual cost of foodborne illness was $77.7 billion.96  That amount is equivalent 
to €212 per capita at current prices.97  
There are no directly comparable estimates for the EU. Regular surveys of foodborne illnesses in Europe 
are available, although based on a very different methodology.98 
The importance of food safety standards becomes clear on the occasions when they fail, leading to 
massive and costly outbreaks of foodborne illnesses. The BSE crisis of the 1990s led to more than 200 
human deaths, most of them in the UK. Sales of beef in the UK immediately declined by 40 percent, 
millions of animals were destroyed, and economic losses included an estimated 4 billion pounds spent 
by the British government, along with private sector losses of more than a billion pounds in the first year 
of the crisis.99  Restrictions on UK beef exports resulting from the crisis were not completely eliminated 
until 2006. A different livestock disease crisis in the UK, the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak of 2001, 
had an estimated total cost to the British economy of £8 billion.100  Prevention of such epidemics is a 
crucial and valuable goal of food safety regulation, although there is no obvious way to assign a specific 
monetary value to this benefit.
7.5. Animal welfare
The European Commission and member states have been promoting animal welfare for over 40 years, 
with rules ensuring that farm animals enjoy freedom from hunger, thirst, pain, disease, fear, distress, and 
95  Jennifer McEntire (2014), “Foodborne Illness: How do the U.S. and EU Compare?”, http://achesongroup.com/2014/03/
foodborne-illness-us-eu-compare/. 
96  Robert L. Scharff (2012), “Economic burden from health losses due to foodborne illness in the United States”, Journal of 
Food Protection 75, 123-131. 
97  Monetary estimates in Scharff (2012) are in 2010 dollars, and based on a 2006 US population of 299 million. 
98  For example, EFSA and European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (2015), “The European Union summary report 
on trends and sources of zoonoses, zoonotic agents and food-borne outbreaks in 2013”, EFSA Journal 13, 3991. 
99  Nigel Atkinson (2001), “The Impact of BSE on the UK Economy,” http://www.veterinaria.org/revistas/vetenfinf/
bse/14Atkinson.html; Patrick von Swanenberg and Erik Millstone (2002), “Mad cow disease 1980s – 2000: How reassurances 
undermined precaution”, in EEA (2002), Late Lessons from Early Warnings. 
100  As cited in Centro Richerche Produzioni Animali (CRPA) et al. (2014), “Assessing farmers’ cost of compliance with EU 
legislation in the fields of environment, animal welfare and food safety,” European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/
external-studies/2014/farmer-costs/fulltext_en.pdf. 
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freedom to express normal behavior.101  Important accomplishment in this area include the elimination 
of battery cages for hens, improved space and standards for pigs, a ban on animal testing for cosmetics, 
and continuous improvement in animal transport conditions. 
Regulation of the treatment of farm animals aims to improve the welfare of the animals involved, but 
there is of course no way to ask the animals about how much they value humane treatment. In most 
cases, the only information available about the monetary value of this benefit concerns the importance 
that people place on animal welfare. (In some cases, there could also be information about the costs 
of livestock diseases caused by animal welfare abuse.) For some people, animal rights are a matter of 
ethical principles and moral obligation. For many people, better treatment of farm animals has a direct 
economic value, reflected in willingness to pay for humanely produced food.
Several studies have estimated consumer willingness to pay for meat produced according to animal 
welfare standards. A UK study found that consumers were willing to pay 26 to 34 percent more for 
meat from animals that enjoyed good to excellent animal welfare.102  A German study similarly found 
most consumers willing to pay 27 percent more for meat from chickens certified to meet high animal 
welfare standards.103  Another study found that Spanish consumers were willing to pay 19 to 23 percent 
more than the market price for cured ham with an EU Animal Welfare label, indicating that it meets 
animal welfare standards higher than current legal requirements.104 
One survey of research on these topics concluded that consumers are on average willing to pay 22 
percent more than the base price of meat for additional assurances about food safety, and 14 percent 
for assurances about high levels of animal welfare.105  Another survey found that willingness to pay 
for animal welfare varied little from one country to another, and increased with income; consumers 
consistently showed high interest in the treatment of hens and the elimination of battery cages.106   
A recent cost-benefit analysis estimated the value to American consumers of a national standard 
requiring cage-free egg production.107  Currently only two states, California and Michigan, have adopted 
that requirement. The study distinguished between the direct value to consumers of consuming eggs 
from cage-free hens, and the indirect, altruistic benefit of knowing that all hens are guaranteed a cage-
free existence. Based on earlier research, the study assumed that one-third of American consumers 
have no interest in whether eggs come from cage-free hens; the majority would enjoy the direct 
personal value of cage-free eggs, and a small minority (rising from 6 to 12 percent over the next 15 
years) would experience a larger altruistic benefit. The net effect for all US consumers was a projected 
cumulative net present value of $27 billion over 15 years, or $9.80 (€7.40) per person per year.108 
101  See http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare/index_en.htm. 
102  A. Kehlbacher, R. Bennett and K. Balcombe (2012), “Measuring the consumer benefits of improving farm animal welfare to 
inform welfare labeling,” Food Policy 37, 627-633. 
103  Fadi Makdisi and Rainer Marggraf (2011), “Consumer willingness-to-pay for farm animal welfare in Germany – The case of 
broiler”, University of Göttingen. 
104  Azucena Gracia, Maria L. Loureiro and Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr. (2011), “Valuing an EU animal welfare label using experimen-
tal auctions”, Agricultural Economics 42, 669-677. 
105  Gianni Cicia and Francesca Colantuoni (2010), “WTP for traceable meat attributes: A meta-analysis”, International Jour-
nal on Food System Dynamics 1, 252-263. 
106  Carl Johan Lagerkvist and Sebastian Hess (2011), “A meta-analysis of consumer willingness to pay for farm animal 
welfare”, European Review of Agricultural Economics 38, 55-78. Most of the studies included in the meta-analysis were from 
Sweden, UK, or USA. 
107  Jonathan Ward (2014), “From battery cages to barns: A cost-benefit analysis of a national standard for cage-
free egg production”, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1031&context=cppa_capstones. 
108  Ward projects a cumulative 15-year net present value benefit to consumers of $57.8 billion, offset by $30.3 billion of 
lost consumer surplus due to higher-priced eggs. The net present value is $27.5 billion. Converted to an annual benefit (see 
box in Section 5), this is $3.02 billion per year. Over the 15-year period studied, the projected population of the United States 
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If the same value per person applied in Europe, then the ban on battery cages would be worth €3.7 
billion per year to the EU as a whole. On the one hand, American values might be too high, since average 
incomes are higher in the US. On the other hand, American values might be too low, if the proportion of 
the population experiencing large altruistic benefits from animal welfare is larger in Europe.
averages 339.5 million. Ward’s estimates appear to be in 2008 dollars, the date of the underlying survey research; they were 
inflated to 2015 dollars using the US consumer price index and then converted to 2014 euros at €1.00 = $1.33. The EU total 
value is based on a population of 503 million. 
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8. OTHER AREAS OF REGULATION
The three areas of regulation examined in depth in the preceding sections – chemicals policy, climate 
and energy, and food and agriculture – are not the only cases in which important benefits of regulation 
could be lost by a process of downward harmonization under TTIP. To suggest the broader range of 
regulatory concerns, this section briefly looks at three other areas: public procurement policy; data 
services and privacy; and labor regulations, focusing on limits on working time.
8.1. Public Procurement 
Public procurement – spending by public authorities on works, goods and services – amounts to about 
18 percent of Europe’s GDP.109  Procurement standards are set by numerous national, regional and 
local authorities, frequently favoring the lowest-price bidder. Yet there are many goals for procurement, 
beyond merely minimizing costs. There is a growing awareness of procurement as a mechanism that 
can drive policy change in several areas.110  An exclusive focus on cost reduction could jeopardize the 
quality of infrastructure and services, and could create pressure for contractors to reduce wages and 
ignore environmental standards. On the other hand, multiple criteria for evaluation of tenders creates 
subtle problems of scoring, which local authorities may not always understand.111 
New EU rules on procurement, adopted in 2014, expand on a similar initiative in 2004, allowing 
environmental and social concerns to be taken into account when awarding public contracts.112 
Contracting authorities can develop criteria for the “most economically advantageous tender,” 
incorporating environmental, social and product quality criteria along with price. Under the new rules, 
life-cycle costing, including externalities associated with producing a product, can be taken into account. 
The process by which goods and services are produced can be considered, allowing authorities to favor 
tenders that hire the long-term unemployed or other disadvantaged groups. Abnormally low tenders 
can be asked to explain their low prices, and can be rejected if their prices are based on violation of EU 
or national laws and standards. 
The 2014 rules also streamline and simplify the procurement process, expanding opportunities for 
small and medium enterprises and facilitating cross-border tenders within Europe. The new rules 
were applauded by representatives of parties across the political spectrum, and appear to be broadly 
popular.113  They will not, however, be popular in the context of TTIP or other trade negotiations. One 
of the fundamental, long-standing principles of the World Trade Organization is that countries cannot 
restrict the process by which products are made; such restrictions have repeatedly been rejected as 
unfair restraints of trade. Thus the EU rules on procurement could be perceived as a barrier to trade.
A detailed review of potential non-tariff barriers to trade between the EU and the US, conducted in 2009, 
identified public procurement policies as obstacles to trade in both directions. 114 The US has numerous 
procurement rules that limit or exclude European firms, including extensive national security-based 
restrictions and other “Buy American” policies, requirements to use US-flag vessels for cargo shipping, 
109  EurActiv (2014), “EU brings innovation into public procurement rules,” 15 January 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/future-
eu/parliament-approves-new-rules-pu-news-532783.    
110  Fernando Correia et al. (2013), “Low carbon procurement: An emerging agenda,” Journal of Purchasing and Supply Man-
agement, 58-64. 
111  Mats A. Bergman and Sofia Lundberg (2013), “Tender evaluation and supplier selection methods in public procurement,” 
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 73-83. 
112  Documentation of the new rules can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/mod-
ernising-rules/reform-proposals/index_en.htm. 
113  EurActiv (2014). 
114  Ecorys (2009), “Non-Tariff Measures in EU-US Trade and Investment – An Economic Analysis.” 
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and other local content requirements. The EU has some rules that establish favoritism for European 
firms, e.g. in construction, as well as some domestic content requirements and a bureaucracy that is 
hard for outsiders to understand. On balance, the study found that removal of all public procurement 
barriers to trade would provide much greater benefits to European firms, due to the greater extent of 
American procurement rules. 
In the 2009 survey, US construction companies identified public procurement rules as the most 
important non-tariff barrier to their expansion in Europe.115  Thus under TTIP, public procurement in 
Europe could be exposed to intensified competition from American construction firms. 
More generally, obstacles could be raised to all the social and environmental objectives of public 
procurement. The WTO rule that only the product, not the process, matters, if extended to procurement, 
could undo all of the broader purposes of the recent EU procurement rules. Institutional changes such 
as ISDS could allow businesses to challenge the decisions of public agencies throughout Europe. ISDS 
rulings have forced South Africa to retreat on protection of historically disadvantaged groups, and have 
fined Mexico for a local government’s refusal of a permit for a hazardous waste facility. Similar cases 
could undo much of the intentions and planning for public procurement in Europe, placing 18 percent 
of GDP under the control of international trade rules rather than democratic decisions about European 
priorities.
There is no comprehensive evaluation of the benefits of EU public procurement; it addresses numerous, 
extremely diverse social goals. It is possible to produce rough estimates of the social value of public 
employment, on the same basis as the evaluation of employment from renewable energy in Section 
6. Since public procurement accounts for 18 percent of EU GDP, it seems reasonable to assume that it 
accounts for 18 percent of EU employment, or 39.2 million jobs as of 2014. Loss of even 1 percent of that 
employment from public procurement would represent a social loss of €2.2 – 2.9 billion per year; loss 
of 5 percent would represent a loss of €11 – 14 billion.116  Thus if TTIP leads to even a modest reduction 
in the European employment created by public procurement, it could impose losses of billions of euros 
per year.
8.2. Data Services and Privacy
Regulation of data services and protection of privacy is another area in which Europe and America have 
adopted opposite approaches. In Europe, protection of personal data dates back at least to the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights, and takes its modern form in the 1995 European Directive on 
Data Protection. That directive prevents dissemination of data on an individual unless the individual 
grants unambiguous, specific consent for the proposed use of the data, and prohibits manipulative, 
secret collection of personal data. A revision of the 1995 directive, proposed in 2012 and headed for 
potential adoption in 2016, updates data protection for the Internet and social media age. The new 
proposal strengthens a wide range of data standards, including consent standards and transparency 
requirements, the so-called “right to be forgotten” (that is, the right to delete obsolete and unwanted 
data), the right of data portability (easing transfer of personal data from one service to another), and 
application of EU rules to all companies worldwide that sell products or collect data in Europe.117  
In contrast, in the words of an American legal scholar reviewing the two systems,
115  Ecorys (2009), 186.  
116  As in Section 6, this assumes an average annual salary of €30,000, and a social value of employment of 19.0 – 24.7 per-
cent of labor earnings, based on Bartik (2015). 
117  European Commission (2012), “Why do we need an EU data protection reform?”, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protec-
tion/document/review2012/factsheets/1_en.pdf.   
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The current U.S. consent-based privacy regime allows merchants, databanks and other 
electronic aggregators to decide on the data’s future uses. Once individuals have divulged 
online details about their lives, they are often powerless to prevent its dissemination to 
others…118 
US laws do address privacy in specific sectors such as medical information, educational records, and 
financial data. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has taken action against some of the 
most manipulative, unfair, or deceptive data practices.119  A proposal by the Obama administration to 
expand data privacy protection (though still falling far short of current and proposed EU standards) 
appears doomed to failure in the face of Congressional hostility.120 
In addition, the US Department of Commerce, in consultation with the European Commission, 
developed the US-EU Safe Harbor Framework. This framework, approved by the EU in 2000, allows US 
organizations to make an annual declaration that they are complying with a list of principles, roughly 
equivalent to the 1995 Directive on Data Protection. By making such a declaration, US companies 
can avoid interruptions in their operations in Europe; data can legally be transferred from the EU to 
organizations participating in the Safe Harbor framework.121  Safe Harbor largely allows US businesses 
and organizations to evaluate their own compliance with EU standards, although the FTC has brought 
charges against some companies for Safe Harbor violations.122 
Safe Harbor has been popular, with more than 4,000 organizations listed as complying in 2013.123  But 
there have been strains on the framework in recent years, as the proposed revision to EU standards 
will require strengthening Safe Harbor provisions, while the Snowden revelations have heightened 
awareness of and concern about data protection.124  There have been calls for temporary suspension 
and/or thorough revision and strengthening of the Safe Harbor program.125 
Harmonization of regulations in this area is difficult to imagine: it would require one side or the other to 
abandon its current approach. If EU standards are rolled back, or if Safe Harbor provisions are weakened, 
there will be increased opportunities for international monopolies to dominate Internet activity and on-
line commerce, and reduced protection for privacy and personal data. And even maintaining current 
standards may not be enough to protect against foreign government agencies engaging in the extensive 
surveillance efforts described in the Snowden documents. 
Very partial estimates of the value of regulation in this area might be derived by comparing the cost 
of fraud to consumers and businesses under the looser US standards vs. the stricter EU approach. 
There is, however, no way to assign a comprehensive monetary value to the wide range of benefits of 
regulation in this area. But there is something of great value at stake, which would be lost if EU data and 
privacy protections were rolled back in order to reduce “non-tariff barriers to trade”.
118  Alexander Tsesis (2014), “The right to erasure: Privacy, data brokers and the indefinite retention of data,” Wake Forest Law 
Review 49, 433-484; quote from 434. 
119  Daniel J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog (2014), “The FTC and the new common law of privacy”, Columbia Law Review 114, 
583-676. 
120  Richard J. Peltz-Steele (2015), “The pond betwixt: Differences in the U.S.-EU data protection/safe harbor negotiation”, 
Journal of Internet Law 19, 1-30. 
121  US Department of Commerce (2013), “U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview”, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_
main_018476.asp.  
122  FTC (2014), “FTC approves final orders settling charges of U.S.-EU Safe Harbor violations against 14 companies”, https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/06/ftc-approves-final-orders-settling-charges-us-eu-safe-harbor.   
123  Tsesis (2014), 468. 
124  Peltz-Steele (2015). 
125  Privacy Tracker (2013), “US-EU Safe Harbor Under Pressure”, https://iapp.org/news/a/us-eu-safe-harbor-under-pres-
sure/.   
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8.3. Labor Rights and Working Time
The United States and Europe are far apart on labor rights, the role of unions, social services, and public 
welfare. If TTIP allowed intervention in these areas, forcing downward harmonization of standards, 
there could be immense damage to the well-being of European workers and communities. 
Comparison of the full range of labor and social welfare policies in Europe and America is beyond the 
scope of this report; entire books have been written on the subject. 126 Table 8 1 compares the two 
systems on an important subset of labor policies, examining three areas of regulations that set limits 
on working time in the EU and the US: working time for all workers; parental leave; and working time 
for truck drivers.
In the EU, the Working Time Directive requires member states to guarantee a set of rights for all workers, 
including a work week limited to an average of 48 hours, including any overtime; paid annual leave of 
at least four weeks; a well-defined schedule of daily and weekly rest periods; and other provisions.127 
In the US, there is nothing comparable to the Working Time Directive. The Fair Labor Standards Act 
requires higher pay for overtime for a broad category of workers (roughly speaking, non-professional 
employees), but “does not limit the number of hours per day or per week that employees aged 16 
years and older can be required to work,” in the words of a US Department of Labor website.128 There 
is no maximum work week, no requirement for paid annual leave, and no minimum rest periods for the 
workforce as a whole.
The gap between European and American standards is narrower, but still visible, in the area of parental 
leave. The EU’s Framework Agreement on parental leave guarantees all workers four months of leave, 
for both parents, on the birth or adoption of a child.129  In the US the Family and Medical Leave Act 
provides 12 weeks of leave, for both parents, on birth or adoption, or for caring for serious health 
problems in a worker’s immediate family. However, the US law excludes workers at firms with fewer 
than 50 employees, and also excludes those who have worked less than 1,250 hours (about seven 
months of full-time work) at their current place of employment.130  Both systems guarantee the right to 
return to the same or an equivalent job. Moreover, many higher-income European countries, which are 
perhaps more economically comparable to the United States, provide parental leaves that are far more 
generous than the EU’s minimum standard.
Finally, the hours of work allowed for truck drivers is an area of detailed regulation in both Europe and 
America. As both systems have recognized, exhausted drivers are a hazard to themselves and others 
on the roads, so protecting workers in this case also protects public safety. European regulations are 
distinctly more protective, limiting driving time to 9 hours a day, 56 hours a week, and 90 hours every 
two weeks; America allows 11 hours a day and 70 hours every 8 days.131  EU truck drivers get a 45 
minute break every 4.5 hours, while their US counterparts get a 30 minute break after 8 hours behind 
the wheel.
126  Among many others, see Gosta Esping-Andersen, editor (1996), Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in 
Global Economies (London: Sage Publications). 
127 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706&langId=en&intPageId=205. 
128 http://www.dol.gov/elaws/faq/esa/flsa/013.htm. 
129 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:em0031. 
130 http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/. 
131 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/road/social_provisions/driving_time/index_en.htm; https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/
regulations/hours-of-service. 
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UE US
Working 
time limits: 
all workers
Weekly work limited to average of 48 
hours, including any overtime.
Paid annual leave of at least 4 weeks.
Minimum rest periods:
   24 consecutive hours every week
   11 consecutive hours in every 24 
   A rest break during work if on duty
   for more than six hours
Non-professional employees receive 
150% of normal hourly pay for work 
in excess of 40 hours per week.
         No other working time 
         limits for all workers.
Parental 
leave
Four months of leave on birth or 
adoption of child, for all workers.
12 weeks of leave on birth or 
adoption of child, or serious medical 
problem in immediate family.
Available to workers in public sector 
agencies, and firms with more than 
50 employees, after working 1,250 
hours.
Working 
time limits: 
truck drivers
Daily driving limited to 9 hours; may 
extend to 10 hours twice a week.
Limit of 56 hours per week, and 90 
hours per fortnight (two weeks).
Daily rest of 11 hours, can be 9 hours 3 
times a week.
Weekly rest of 45 consecutive hours, 
can be 24 hours every second week.
Breaks of 45 minutes after 4.5 hours 
driving.
Daily driving limited to 11 hours; daily 
work limited to 14 hours.132  
Limit of 70 hours every 8 days. 
Daily rest of 10 hours.
Weekly rest of 34 consecutive hours, 
including two periods of 1:00 – 5:00 
AM.
Breaks of 30 minutes after 8 hours 
driving.
132
The American overreliance on cost-benefit analysis has played an unfortunate role in the standards 
for truck drivers. The agency that proposed the regulations, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA), favored a 10-hour daily limit on driving, and even explored a 9-hour limit. 
However, cost-benefit analysis did not show a clear benefit from reducing the limit to 10 hours, so the 
agency concluded that it had to endorse the 11-hour limit. FMCSA found that a 10-hour limit might 
132  The additional 3 hours may include loading and unloading, refueling, and other non-driving tasks. 
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	 EU	 US	
Working	time	
limits:	all	workers	
Weekly	work	limited	to	average	of	48	
hours,	including	any	overtime.	
Paid	annual	leave	of	at	least	4	weeks.	
Minimum	rest	p riods:	
			24	consecutive	hours	every	week	
			11	consecutive	hours	in	every	24		
			A	rest	break	during	work	if	on	duty	
			for	more	than	six	hours	
Non-professional	employees	receive	
150%	of	normal	hourly	pay	for	work	in	
excess	of	40	hours	per	week.	
	
	
									No	other	working	time		
									limits	for	all	workers.	
Parental	leave	 Four	months	of	leave	on	birth	or	
adoption	of	child,	for	all	workers.	
12	weeks	of	leave	on	birth	or	adoption	
of	child,	or	serious	medical	problem	in	
immediate	family.	
Available	to	workers	in	public	sector	
agencies,	and	firms	with	more	than	50	
employees,	after	working	1,250	hours.	
Working	time	
limits:	truck	
drivers	
Daily	driving	limited	to	9	hours;	may	
extend	to	10	hours	twice	a	week.	
Limit	of	56	hours	per	week,	and	90	
hours	per	fortnight	(two	weeks).	
Daily	rest	of	11	hours,	can	be	9	hours	
3	times	a	week.	
Weekly	rest	of	45	consecutiv 	hours,	
can	be	24	hours	every	second	week.	
	
	
Breaks	of	45	minutes	after	4.5	hours	
driving.	
Daily	driving	limited	to	11	hours;	daily	
work	limited	to	14	hours.132	
Limit	of	70	hours	every	8	days.		
	
Daily	rest	of	10	hours.	
	
Weekly	rest	of	34	c nsecutive	hours,	
including	two	periods	of	1:00	–	5:00	
AM.	
	
Breaks	of	30	minutes	after	8	hours	
driving.	
Table	8-1.	Selected	labor	laws:	EU	-	US	comparison	
Sources:	European	Commission	and	US	government	websites	(see	text	and	footnotes).	
The	American	overreliance	on	cost-benefit	analysis	has	played	an	unfortunate	role	in	the	standards	for	
truck	drivers.	The	agency	that	proposed	the	regulations,	the	Federal	Motor	Carrier	Safety	Administration	
(FMCSA),	favored	a	10-hour	daily	limit	on	driving,	and	even	explored	a	9-hour	limit.	However,	cost-
benefit	analysis	did	not	show	a	clear	benefit	from	reducing	the	limit	to	10	hours,	so	the	agency	
concluded	that	it	had	to	endorse	the	11-hour	limit.	FMCSA	found	that	a	10-hour	limit	might	save	more	
																																								 																				
132
	The	additional	3	hours	may	include	loading	and	unloading,	refueling,	and	other	non-driving	tasks.	
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save more lives and prevent more crashes, but would also increase costs. Although it is well known 
that crash risk increases with work hours, FMCA concluded that the available data “are not sufficiently 
robust to yield a statistically significant distinction between the crash risk associated with any two 
adjacent hours of work.”133 
The principal change currently being considered in US trucking regulations is an increase in allowable 
hours, combined with other rollbacks of truck safety. Responding to lobbying by the trucking industry, 
Congress is pushing to allow 82 hours of driving per week, as well as longer and heavier trucks, and 
younger drivers (starting at age 18 instead of 21 for interstate trucking).134  Deregulation, rather than 
worker health or public safety, is the focus of debate in Washington today.
Harmonization to American standards in labor rights and social welfare would be an immense loss 
to Europe, although it is difficult to put a monetary value on the benefits of regulation in these areas. 
In the area of truck safety alone, the US had 3,964 fatalities in crashes involving trucks in 2013; the 
annual cost of truck and bus crashes in America is estimated to be $99 billion.135  Some – it is hard to 
say exactly how much – of this human and economic cost is avoided by stricter regulation in Europe.
133  See the presentation of the final rule in the Federal Register at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-12-27/pdf/2011-
32696.pdf; quote is from p. 81135. 
134  Howard Abramson (2015), “The trucks are killing us”, New York Times, August 21. 
135  Abramson (2015). 
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9. THE GAINS FROM TTIP: POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE? 
The many dimensions of regulatory benefits, as seen in the previous sections, are invisible in most 
studies of the economic impacts of TTIP. Risk management for toxic chemical use, mitigation of climate 
change, protection of food safety and animal welfare, data privacy, support for local communities and 
labor and social standards – all of this could be at risk under TTIP, yet all of this is missing in the 
standard economic assessments. Instead, regulations are seen as non-tariff barriers to trade, which 
have to be rolled back in order to achieve, according to one widely cited estimate, an annual gain of 
€68 - 119 billion for the European economy.
Even that modest amount of economic growth is uncertain. It is based on global trade models, almost 
all of which rely on the assumption of permanent full employment. Workers who lose their jobs to trade 
liberalization are assumed to find new jobs in growing sectors of the economy. The replacement jobs 
may pay different wages, may be located in different regions, or may require different skills, but, in these 
models, there is never any involuntary unemployment. This unrealistic assumption is mathematically 
convenient, and has become familiar to economic modelers – but it renders the models unable to 
determine whether a country or region will gain or lose jobs from a trade agreement. By assumption, 
employment is projected to be unchanged; this is an input to the models, not an output from them. 
Extensive critiques have shown that unrealistic assumptions such as full employment are crucial to 
standard trade models; tweaking these assumptions can reverse a model’s main findings.136  
One major assessment of TTIP takes a different approach to the question of unemployment. Jeronim 
Capaldo, a researcher who is now at the International Labor Organization, used the United Nations 
Global Policy Model (GPM) to analyze the expected effects of TTIP on the economies of Europe, 
America, and the rest of the world.137  Unlike the trade models used by CEPR and others, GPM assumes 
that economic activity and employment depend on the level of aggregate demand (i.e., total spending 
by households, businesses and governments, plus net exports). 
In Capaldo’s analysis, using the same patterns of expansion of US-EU trade under TTIP as in other 
models, there would be a gain of 784,000 jobs in the US and a loss of 583,000 jobs in the EU. TTIP 
would speed up GDP growth in the US and slow it down throughout the EU. Most of the European job 
losses and the greatest slowdown in growth would occur in France, Germany and other countries of 
northern Europe. But, according to Capaldo, every part of the EU would lose jobs and experience slower 
growth as a result of TTIP. Although TTIP would expand European exports to the US, it would, in this 
analysis, lead to a reduction in net exports as a percentage of GDP for all of Europe. Declines in intra-
European trade and in Europe’s trade with the rest of the world, combined with increased imports from 
the US, would outweigh the benefits of greater exports to the US.
An impassioned critique of Capaldo’s work insists that he has used methods that virtually all economists 
would reject, and suggests that there are several technical defects in his model.138  Capaldo’s response 
addresses and disputes the claims of technical defects, argues that the full employment assumption of 
other models is unrealistic, and poses the underlying choice between modeling approaches: in analysis 
of the impacts of TTIP on Europe, 
136  Lance Taylor and Rudi von Arnim (2006), “Modeling the impact of trade liberalisation: A critique of computable general 
equilibrium models,” Oxfam International Research Report; Ackerman and Gallagher (2008); Werner Raza et al. (2014), “AS-
SESS_TTIP: Assessing the Claimed Benefits of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,” Austrian Foundation for 
Development Research (ÖFSE). 
137  Jeronim Capaldo (2014), “The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: European Disintegration, Unemployment 
and Instability,” Global Development and Environment Institute Working Paper 14-03, Tufts University. 
138  Matthias Bauser and Fredrik Erixon (2015), “ ‘Splendid Isolation’ as Trade Policy: Mercantilism and Crude Keynesianism in 
‘the Capaldo Study’ of TTIP”, ECIPE. 
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…projections with full-employment models suggest net economic benefits while a demand-
driven model projects net losses. It is up to policymakers to take one view or the other based 
on how sensible the respective underlying assumptions appear.139
In short, even in a narrowly economic assessment, focusing on income and employment impacts 
rather than the broader range of regulatory benefits, TTIP is only a bargain for Europe under specific, 
debatable assumptions. Under different assumptions, the EU would be worse off with TTIP, even by 
the narrowest economic criteria.
In addition, by requiring or encouraging regulatory harmonization, TTIP would put many benefits 
of European regulations at risk. The purposes of regulations – protection of human health and the 
natural environment, maintenance of social and labor standards, creation of strong and sustainable 
communities, stabilization of the earth’s climate – are well worth pursuing, today as much as in the 
past. Why risk losing these greater goods in the pursuit of the small and uncertain gains projected by 
some but not all economic models? 
139  Jeronim Capaldo (2015), “Overcooked Free-Trade Dogmas in the Debate on TTIP”, Global Development and Environment 
Institute, Tufts University. 
EUROPE’S REGULATIONS AT RISK                    |         bu.edu/gegi         |         04/2016 44
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Thanks to Ronan O’Brien for numerous helpful suggestions, to Elizabeth A. Stanton and Steve 
Suppan for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts, and to Ezgi Karaca and Joseph Daniel for research 
assistance. The author bears sole responsibility for the content of this report.
         
          
          
          
Global Economic Governance Initiative
The Frederick S. Pardee  
School of Global Studies  
at Boston University
+1 (617) 358-0988
bu.edu/gegi
gegi@bu.edu
121 Bay State Road, 
Boston, MA 02215
